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INTRODUCTION
This paper is part of a larger study examining the question of whether
or not companies are choosing to manage a complex engineering activity
such as large-scale software development with a range of strategic
considerations and organizational as well as technological approaches that
corresponds to the spectrum usually associated with "hard" manufacturing,
i.e. job shops, batch organizations, and factories exhibiting various degrees
of flexibility in product mixes and technologies. The research project
includes the proposal of technology and policy criteria defining what a
factory environment for software might look like; a survey of 38 software
facilties in the U.S. and Japan to determine where firms stand in relation to
these criteria; and detailed case studies examining the technology and policy
implementation process followed at firms identified as being close to the
factory model 1
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There are several interrelated conclusions: (1) This spectrum, including
"factory" approaches, is observable in a statistically significant sample of 38
software facilities in the U.S. and Japan. (2) There appears to be nothing
inherent in software as a technology that prevents some firms from
managing the development process more effectively than others. (3) The
approach to developing a technological infrastructure to aid software
development is not significantly different between Japanese and U.S. firms.
(4) But, Japanese firms -- led by the NEC group and Toshiba, and followed
by Hitachi and Fujitsu -- are significantly ahead of most U.S. competitors in
applying a disciplined and flexible "factory" approach -- production-
management concepts, general-use tools, standardized procdures, effective
quality-control techniques -- to large-scale software development. Other
U.S. firms relatively close to the flexible factory model are TRW and, to a
lesser extent, Sperry and System Development Corporation (SDC), now both
part of Unisys.
This paper presents the results of Hitachi's responses to the survey and
then extends beyond this to analyze what is probably the most difficult
aspect of the software factory -- the implementation process and the
benefits or disadvantages this environment might offer in operation. Hitachi
is significant for two reasons: One, its Software Works (originally a facility
performing both systems and applications programming) was the first
software factory established in the world, and Hitachi has made availabe
extensive historical and technical documentation for this facility's
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technological and policy systems. Two, Hitachi has extended its factory
approach to both applications and systems software development.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Continuing the
introduction, the first section presents the survey criteria and results, and
examines the Hitachi responses and comments for individual critiera. The
subsequent sections focus on the motivations behind the founding of Hitachi
Software Works in the late-1960s, and organizational and technological
development between 1969 and 1986, including the institution of various
controls and support-systems for production management and product
engineering. The conclusion contrasts Hitachi's implementation process with
System Development Corporation in the U.S. and notes the historical focus
on development factory standards first, that is, before investing heavily in a
factory technological infrastructure. It also reviews the Hitachi case in light
of several theoretical benefits the factory approach might provide:
dissemination of good technologies and practices; enhanced focus on
productivity and product cost/performance; reduction in individual
dysfunctional behavior; improvement in process management and control.
I. COMPARISON TO THE SURVEY CRITERIA
In the survey of 38 software facilities in the U.S. and Japan, utilizing
criteria extrapolated from System Development Corporation's Software
Factory Experiment in the mid-1970s, Hitachi Omori Works and Hitachi
3
Software Works were just above average on the scale toward the "flexible
factory" model (see Appendix data tables). Overall, Omori ranked 12th (75%,
8% above the sample mean but average for Japanese facilities); and the
Software Works 14th (73%). In the technology area, they ranked,
respectively, 15th and 19th; in the policy/methodology area, 13th and 15th.
Among the 17 Japanese facilities responding, they were about average,
ranking 9th and 11th. Thus, though Hitachi has been the historical world
leader in promoting the factory approach, judged by the survey criteria, it
was not pursuing this strategy as rigorously as other firms. The specific
responses to individual criteria examined below are abbreviated as
Applications (indicating Omori Software Works) and Systems (indicated
Hitachi Software Works).2 Later sections will elaborate on the tools or
capabilities described.
SURVEY ANSWERS KEY:
4 = CAPABILITY OR POLICY IS FULLY USED OR ENFORCED
3 = CAPABILITY OR POLICY IS FREQUENTLY USED OR ENFORCED
2 = CAPABILITY OR POLICY IS SOMETIMES USED OR ENFORCED
1 = CAPABILITY OR POLICY IS SELDOM USED OR ENFORCED
O = CAPABILITY OR POLICY IS NOT USED
n = 38 (Jap. = 17, U.S. = 21)
i. TECHNOLOGY/FACILITY INFRASTRUCTURE
ALL COMPANIES/FACILITIES
All Companies Japanese U.S.
Question Mean S. Dev. Mean S. Dev. Mean S. Dev.
A 3.47 0.62 3.38 0.65 3.55 0.58
B 3.45 0.71 3.69 0.48 3.25 0.79
C 3.07 1.02 2.97 0.87 3.15 1.13
D 2.55 1.04 2.99 0.67 2.20 1.14
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2.68
3.04
2.67
1.85
1.18
1.08
1.25
1.06
2.44
3.40
2.94
2.37
1.17
0.86
1.08
0.82
2.88
2.75
2.45
1.43
APPLICATIONS COMPANIES/FACILITIES
All Companies
Mean S. Dev.
3.35 0.62
3.31 0.76
2.97 1.10
2.54 0.93
2.65 1.25
2.84 1.18
2.54 1.36
1.86 1.04
Japanese
Mean S. Dev.
3.15 0.71
3.58 0.52
2.70 0.93
2.83 0.67
2.20 1.27
3.23 0.98
2.75 1.66
2.38 0.64
U.S.
Mean S. Dev.
3.50 0.50
3.12 0.84
3.16 1.18
2.33 1.03
2.96 1.14
2.56 1.24
2.39 1.39
1.50 1.12
SYSTEMS COMPANIES/FACILITIES
All Companies
Mean S. Dev.
3.68 0.55
3.68 0.52
3.25 0.84
2.57 1.19
2.75 1.05
3.39 0.74
2.89 1.00
1.82 1.08
Japanese
Mean S Dev.
3.71 0.36
3.86 0.35
3.36 0.58
3.21 0.59
2.79 0.92
3.64 0.58
3.21 0.59
2.36 1.03
U.S.
Mean S. Dev.
3.64 0.69
3.50 0.60
3.14 1.03
1.93 1.29
2.71 1.16
3.14 0.79
2.57 1.21
1.29 0.84
A. Centralization of development for a distinct software product family in
a single location or directly linked sites operating as an integrated
unit, rather than decentralizing development in independent sites.
Applications:
Systems:
4
4
These answers were above the sample average, though systems
companies and facilities averaged nearly 4. It was Hitachi
company policy to centralize both systems software development
(in the Software Works) and large-scale applications (at Omori).
B. A uniform set of specification, design, coding, testing, and
documentation procedures used among project groups within a
centralized facility or across different sites working on the same
product family to facilitate standardization of practices and/or division
5
E
F
H
1.15
1.14
1.34
1.04
Question
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
Question
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
l
of labor for programming tasks and related activities.
Applications: 4
Systems: 4
These answers were above the sample average, though common
for Japanese firms, especially systems facilities. Both Hitachi
facilities used established "factory standardards" for design
documentation, coding methods, testing methods, etc.
C. A centralized program library system to store modules and
documentation.
Applications: 3
Systems: 3
Average responses. Hitachi did not centralize these for the
entire facilities but they did for each project.
D. A central production or development data base connecting programming
groups working on a single product family to track information on
milestones, task completion, resources, and system components, to
facilitate overall project control and to serve as a data source for
statistics on programmer productivity, costs, scheduling accuracy, etc.
Applications: 3
Systems: 4
Above average. Centralized control was provided through the
Computer-Aided Production Control System (CAPS). [Use of
this was not mandatory in Omori, apparently to provide
development groups with more flexibility in project management
for customized software.]
E. Project data bases standardized for all groups working on the same
product components, to support consistency in building of program
modules, configuration management, documentation, maintenance, and
potential reusability of code.
Applications: 1
Systems: 2
Below average responses. The low score at Omori reflected the
wide variety of projects and customers, but was low even for
an applications facility.
F. A specific group or groups designated to develop and disseminate
methodologies and tools to automate tasks such as requirements
6
specification and design, coding, documentation, system testing and
debugging, as well as to facilitate standardization of practices and
division of labor, and effective managerial control over all programming
activities.
Applications: 4
Systems: 4
Above average, though systems facilities usually scored 4. In
both Hitachi facilities, there were production engineering
groups that performed this function.
G. A system interface providing the capability to link support tools,
project data bases, the centralized production data base and program
libraries.
Applications: 4
Systems: 2
The Systems response was below average and especially low for
a Japanese firm. The Applications response was especially high
for an applications facility. According to the survey
respondent, Omori was more advanced in this area due to the
development of EAGLE (Effective Approach to Achieving High.
Level Software Productivity), an integrated program-generating
tool and methodology that provided a standardized interface for
applications software development.
H. Automated or semi-automated integration of applicable data from
support tools and development data bases with management control
systems (project data bases and the central production data base), for
each phase of program development; and the utilization of this
capability to facilitate budgeting, forecasting, maintenance, and overall
life-cyle cost control on current and future projects.
Applications: 2
Systems: 2
These responses were slightly above average for the sample,
though somewhat low for Japanese facilities. The Hitachi
managers noted that project progress control, and historical
recording of program corrections or changes, were "mechanized"
functions.
II. METHODOLOGY & POLICY INFRASTRUCTURE
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ALL COMPANIES/FACILITIES
All Companies
Mean S. Dev.
1.77 1.20
2.50 1.30
3.33 0.89
2.00 1.11
2.81 1.07
2.67 0.98
2.46 1.16
2.07 1.28
1.99 1.04
2.53 1.25
1.94 1.27
2.90 1.17
3.18 1.10
2.71 1.03
2.61 1.13
Japanese
Mean S. Dev.
1.85 1.14
2.98 1.08
3.55 0.65
2.05 1.21
3.20 0.95
3.30 0.60
2.75 1.17
2.88 0.85
2.58 0.87
2.90 1.24
2.33 1.43
2.75 1.29
3.65 0.63
3.13 0.75
3.48 0.53
U.S.
MeanS. Dev.
1.71 1.24
2.16 1.34
3.18 0.99
1.96 1.03
2.54 1.06
2.21 0.94
2.25 1.11
1.50 1.22
1.57 0.94
2.26 1.19
1.67 1.05
3.01 1.06
2.85 1.24
2.42 1.10
2.00 1.04
APPLICATIONS COMPANIES/FACILITIES
All Companies
Mean S. Dev.
1.77 1.20
2.50 1.30
3.33 0.89
2.00 1.11
2.81 1.07
2.67 0.98
2.46 1.16
2.07 1.28
1.99 '1.04
2.53 1.25
1.94 1.27
2.90 1.17
3.18 1.10
2.71 1.03
2.61 1.13
Japanese
Mean S. Dev.
1.85 1.14
2.98 1.08
3.55 0.65
2.05 1.21
3.20 0.95
3.30 0.60
2.75 1.17
2.88 0.85
2.58 0.87
2.90 1.24
2.33 1.43
2.75 1.29
3.65 0.63
3.13 0.75
3.48 0.53
U.S.
Mean S. Dev.
1.71 1.24
2.16 1.34
3.18 0.99
1.96 1.03
2.54 1.06
2.21 0.94
2.25 1.11
1.50 1.22
1.57 0.94
2.26 1.19
1.67 1.05
3.01 1.06
2.85 1.24
2.42 1.10
2.00 1.04
SYSTEMS COMPANIES/FACILITIES
All Companies
Mean S. Dev.
2.21 1.03
2.50 1.04
3.86 0.40
Japanese
Mean S. Dev.
2.43 1.08
2.86 0.95
3.93 0.17
U.S.
Mean S. Dev.
2.00 0.93
2.14 0.99
3.79 0.52
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A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
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K
L
M
N
O
Question
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
Question
A
B
C
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D 2.43 1.13 2.79 1.19 2.07 0.94
E 3.21 0.65 3.36 0.69 3.07 0.56
F 2.75 0.96 3.29 0.52 2.21 0.99
G 2.54 1.13 2.71 0.84 2.36 1.33
H 2.21 1.47 3.57 0.42 0.86 0.69
I 2.21 1.24 2.64 1.19 1.79 1.13
J 2.54 1.20 3.36 1.03 1.71 0.70
K 2.18 1.42 3.14 1.16 1.21 0.92
L 3.36 0.61 3.36 0.79 3.36 0.35
M 3.61 0.43 3.71 0.36 3.50 0.46
N 2.54 1.19 3.07 0.94 2.00 1.16
0 2.39 1.18 2.86 1.38 1.93 0.68
A. Use of a standardized design language
Applications: 3
Systems: 2
Hitachi's Systems response was average for the sample.
Omori's response was high for an applications facility.
B. Use of a standardized module-specification language
Applications: 3
Systems: 3
These were slightly above average for the sample and average
for Japanese facilities.
C. Use of a standardized coding language
Applications: 4
Systems: 4
Slightly above average. Most firms standardized this.
D. Emphasis on high-level abstraction (data-type or procedure abstraction;
object rather than variable orientation)
Applications: 2
Systems: 2
Average, though the systems response was low for a Japanese
facility.
E. Planning for maintainability at the module-design level
9
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Applications: 3
Systems: 3
Average for the sample.
F. Planning for reusability at the module-design level
Applications: 3
Systems: 3
Average for the sample.
G. Planning for portability at the module-design level
Applications: 3
Systems: 2
Applications was average; Softwar Works was somewhat low for
a systems facility.
H. Monitoring of how much code is being reused
Applications: 3
Systems: 4
These were high for the sample but average responses for
Japanese applications and systems facilities. Omori used an
automatic monitoring tool, although it did not place as much
emphasis on keeping track of reuse as the Software Works,
which recently initiated an effort to monitor and promote reuse
of code.
"Layering" of reused modules from the program library, along with
newly written code, to create new programs
Applications: 3
Systems: 2
These were average responses for the sample, though Software
Works was somewhat lower than other Japanese systems
facilities.
J. Cataloging for the program library of common functional modules (e.g. a
date verification routine)
Applications: 3
10
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Systems:
Somewhat above average for the sample, especially the Systems
response.
K. Cataloging for the program library of data abstraction modules (e.g.
table or linked-list managers)
Applications: 3
Systems: 3
Above average for the sample, although the Software Works'
response was average for a Japanese systems facility.
L. Writing of documentation to accompany modules placed in the program
library
Applications: 2
Systems: 2
Below average for the sample.
M. Requirement that, if changes are made in the code of a module in the
program library, the documentation must also be changed
Applications: 4
Systems: 4
Slightly above average for the sample, though average for
Japanese facilities or systems facilities.
N. Formal management promotion (beyond the discretion of individual
project managers) that new code be written in modular form with the
intention that modules (in addition to common subroutines) will then
serve as reusable "units of production" in future projects
Applications: 2
Systems: 2
Below average responses.
0. Formal management promotion (beyond the discretion of individual
project managers) that, if a module designed to perform a specific
function (in addition to common subroutines) is in the program library
system, rather than duplicating such a module, it should be reused
Applications: 3
11
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4
Systems:
Somewhat below average responses.
12
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II. HITACHI: THE STRATEGIC AND STRUCTURAL SETTING
A. Corporate Organization and Products
Hitachi originated in 1908 as the machinery repair section of a mining
company in the town of Hitachi, Japan, a couple hours by train north of
Tokyo. In 1986 it had approximately 80,000 employees and sales in the
neighborhood of $20 billion dollars. Hitachi's major area of business was
communications and electronics equipment, including computers and software
(36% of fiscal 1985 sales), although the company also sold heavy machinery
(21%), home appliances (24%), industrial machinery (9%), and telephone
exchange equipment and other products (10%).3 In computer sales among
Japanese companies during 1985, Hitachi ranked fourth, behind Fujitsu, IBM
Japan, and NEC, but was traditionally the market leader in large mainframes
and second to IBM in very-large mainframes. 4
For most of its history, Hitachi's organization has centered around
factories, of which the company operated 28 domestically in 1986. These
belonged to 7 groups: Computers, Electronic Devices, Consumer Products,
Industrial Components and Equipment, Industrial Processes, Power Generation
and Transmission, and International Operations. Group headquarters retained
responsiblity for sales, but factories have been responsible for product
engineering and manufacturing. Factories also operate as independent profit
centers, with financial management based on 6-month budgets for each
factory. Plant managers are thus responsible for engineering and production
costs, the setting of production amounts, and any related expenses; and
company policy has required factory managers to institute standardized
controls and procedures for budgets as well as engineering and manufacturing
13
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management. There have been no exceptions, not even in the case of
software. 5 This is what led to the birth of the world's first software
factory.
B. The Computer Group
Computer exports for Hitachi have been relatively small in comparison
to domestic sales (about 17% in 1985).6 Mainframes are designed to compete
specifically with IBM models as well as to be fully compatible, and appeared
to be of unique designs. For example, the AS/9000, introduced around 1982
to compete with IBM's 3081 model, used denser circuitry and a shorter data-
flow path than IBM to provide considerably more computing power for the
dollar. It was also, according to Datamation, "a more expandable and more
cost-effective mainframe, with expanded performance levels when compared
to a similar IBM system." 7 Hitachi computers introduced to compete with
IBM's new 3090 Sierra series, the AS/XL 60 and 80, also achieved computing
speeds equivalent to the IBM machines with half the number of processors
and at a lower price. 8
The 1982 incident in which Hitachi engineers were caught by the FBI
attempting to buy information on the 3081 operating system, particularly new
features that IBM had decided to imbed in microcode ("firmware"), suggests
that Hitachi has actively sought information on IBM machines and software
to help its hardware and software engineers design compatible products. 9
This process of information gathering or even "reverse engineering" may
have also aided the performance of Hitachi mainframes and software.
14
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It is also the case, however, that underlying Hitachi's apparent
technical success in hardware and software is a long history of computer
development. Hitachi engineers began experimenting with this technology in
the mid-1950s and completed their first model in 1957, using parametrons (a
solid-state device used primarily in Japan during the 1950s), and then a
transistorized business computer in 1959. The model for this machine was
developed at a Ministry of International Trade and Industry research
institute, the Electrotechnical Laboratory (ETL), and largely completed during
1956 -- two years before the commercial introduction of transistorized
computers in the United States. The main ETL designer, Takahashi Sigeru,
helped transfer this technology to Hitachi and moved to the company
formally in 1962, where he headed hardware product development until
1980.10 Along with in-house research and product development, Hitachi also
benefited from a licensing agreement with RCA between 1961 and 1970,
through which it manufactured RCA-designed computers, as well as sold RCA
software, for resale under the Hitachi label in Japan.
The production of computer products before 1961, along with the
arrangement with RCA, reflected a dual strategy within Hitachi: independent
development of new technology as well as direct purchasing of technology
from abroad. This two-fold approach turned out to be extremely important:
When RCA failed to introduce competitive new products in the late 1960s
and then withdrew from computers in 1970, Hitachi had sufficient internal
expertise to design machines that would eventually compete with the IBM
370 and subsequent mainframes. Equally important, Hitachi engineers had an
15
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opportunity to cultivate independent skills and develop a distinctive, factory-
centered approach to software development. 11
Hitachi's computer group in the mid-1980s consisted of six main
facilities, two for software and four for hardware. The Software Works,
which started with 348 employees in 1969, grew to nearly 3000 before being
separated into two sites during 1985. It has continued to produce operating
systems for mainframes, mini-computers, and office computers; related
systems software (such as language processors); and on-line data-base
programs. The smallest programs were several thousand lines of code and the
largest several hundred thousand. 12 Omori Software Works produces large-
scale customized applications programs such as real-time banking or factory
control software. Research and development on new hardware technologies
as well as software development tools and design concepts took place in two
corporate facilities. 13 In addition, Hitachi had numerous subsidiaries
producing computer-related products and services, including 23 software
companies. 14
HITACHI COMPUTER GROUP, CA. 1986
LINE FACILITY EMPLOYEES PRODUCTS
Hardware
Kanagawa Works 2,800 Mainframe Computers
Odawara Works 2,400 Peripherals
Asahi Works 1,100 Small-Scale Computers
Device Development 80 Semiconductor Devices
Center
Software
Software Works 1,400 Systems Software
16
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1,500 Applications Software
CORPORATE R&D
Central Research Labs 1,200 Basic Research
Systems Development 350 Systems and Applications
Laboratory Software Technology
C. Corporate Programs for Engineering and Manufacturing Improvement
The Software Works, as a Hitachi factory, takes part in all company-
wide efforts at analyzing and improving various aspects of engineering and
manufacturing operations. Several corporate programs appear to have led to
an increasing refinement and improvement of the factory concept (technology
and procedures) for software, and of engineering performance in this area.
For example, a company-wide movement among Hitachi factories since 1968
has been the "Management Improvement" (MI) program. The major focus of
this has been to promote the establishment and implementation of specific
standardzation, "zero defect," and productivity-improvement objectives. 15 At
the Software Works, during 1969-1971, this movement took the form of
setting standards for design, programming, and testing activities, introducing
a document control system and a zero-defect program, and launching a study
of how to reduce personnel costs and increase programmer performance. As
a next step, in 1973 managers asked all planning personnel to submit
suggestions on how to improve productivity; this resulted in 1437 proposals,
some of which were adopted quickly -- such as structured programming
techniques and better debugging methods.
17
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Omori Software Works
Also under the Management Improvement program, during the later
1970s, the Software Works launched studies of design productivity, reliability,
profit generation, and market share. 16 Management formally organized these
efforts through the factory staff structure, such as a Rationalization
Promotion Center in 1975 (headed by the factory manager). 1 7 The company-
wide focus in recent years has centered on three specific areas and potential
ways to integrate and improve productivity in product engineering and
production; Hitachi has equally applied the concepts and recommendations in
hardware and software facilities: 18
Area Main Objective Solutions
Design technology Shorter times CAD
Standardization
Production engineering Labor reduction Automation
Process improvement
Control technology Less work-in-process Inventory control
Another example is quality assurance. Since the founding of the
company, Hitachi has followed a practice called "gleaning," which involves
picking out product- or system-design errors, analyzing them, and then
formally recommending solutions and making reports to colleagues. Factories
have case reports once a month; there are also reports at the division level
approximately once every other month. The Software Works adopted this
practice in 1977, with the particular objective of developing design and
analysis procedures that would reduce the recurrence of system problems
identified by customers, such as not meeting user specifications or designing
programs that were not "user friendly." 19
18
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11. SOFTWARE STRATEGY: THE FACTORY MODEL
A. The 1960S: Product Proliferation and Programmer Shortages
The first Hitachi computers of the late 1950s and early 1960s used
drums for main memory, and paper tape for entering programs and data as
well as receiving output. Thus, they did not require software except for
simple input/output programs and a few subroutines for scientific
calculations. With the inclusion of core memory and card readers during
1963-1965, it became possible to use higher-level languages such as
FORTRAN and to write more sophisticated programs. Yet the hardware still
had no interrupt features, so control programs were small. The first program
resembling a modern operating system for a Hitachi computer was a Fortran
"monitor" system introduced with the HITAC 4010 in 1965.20 But this was
actually an RCA product (model 401), which Hitachi produced from imported
knock-down kits; Hitachi required little product engineering or software
knowledge, except to be able to service the machine. 21
An in-house project, on the other hand, provided Hitachi engineers with
extensive experience in both hardware and software development, as well as
began to strain engineering resources. In the early 1960s, Hitachi's Central
Research Laboratory took on contracts with Tokyo University, the Japanese
Meteorological Agency, and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone's main
laboratory to build a very-large scale computer capable of time sharing,
dubbed the HITAC 5020. The Central Laboratory completed one unit for its
19
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own use in 1964 and then, under the direction of Shimada Shozo, set out to
produce an operating ("monitor") system that would allow the 5020 to
perform input, output, and computation functions simultaneously. Laboratory
engineers had previous experience developing an assembler and FORTRAN
compiler for Hitachi's parametron computers; between 20 and 30 were
assigned to work on software for the 5020. The Central Laboratory was one
of two sources of computer expertise in Hitachi at the time; the other was
the Totsuka Works, which produced telecommunications equipment and had
led the company's entrance into computers during the 1950s.2 2
Shimada's major source of ideas for the operating system software was
MIT, where he and several other Hitachi engineers visited in 1965 on the
introduction of a Tokyo University professor to the head of MIT's electrical
engineering department. MIT researchers were then developing their own
time-sharing system, Multics, using a GE mainframe. Shimada received a copy
of the manual, which discussed several new approaches and ideas such as 2-
level addresses and virtual memory. In Shimada's words, the Multics manual
"actually made our mouths water." As soon as he returned to the Central
Research Laboratory, he made the development of a comparable operating
system his next project, in cooperation with Tokyo University's Computing
Center. The first delivery of the 5020 was in 1965, to Tokyo University. 23
They finished a Japanese version of Multics in 1968, a couple years before
MIT.24
The 5020( was not suited for businesses and the project team became
short-handed as Hitachi management gave priority to developing system
20
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software for the HITAC 8000 series. 25 Introduced during 1967-1969, the
8000 family was a Japanese version of the RCA Spectra series (which was
partially compatible with the IBM 360). The 8000 also provided a major
incentive to create a formal strategy and mechanism for program
development, because RCA was not developing adequate system software.
Hitachi decided at first to use the RCA operating system, TDOS, but this
required at least two magnetic-tape stations for compilers and the program
library. In contrast, a major feature of the IBM 360 was that all functions
were available on a faster and larger disc drive system. While RCA
hesitated over whether or not to develop a disc system, Japanese customers
insisted on this, prompting Hitachi to start modifying RCA's TDOS around
1966 and create a new "disc operating system," DOS. 26
Designing an effective disc operating system capable of on-line
processing exacerbated the strain on software-engineering resources in
Hitachi. The manager of the project, Sakata Kazuyuki, found 80 engineers
to work on the system, with assistance from Hitachi's Central Research
Laboratory, the Totsuka Works, two subsidiaries (Hitachi Electronics Service
and Hitachi Electronics Engineering), and a subcontractor, Yoshizawa
Business Machines. (The groups from Hitachi Electronics Engineering and
Yoshizawa remained together and formed the basis of the company's largest
software subsidiary, Hitachi Software Engineering, established in 1969.)27
Both TDOS and DOS provided the basic structure of EDOS, which allowed
for greater volume on-line and large-scale batch processing and was
completed in 1969; this became the foundation for Hitachi's current operating
system for large-scale computers. 28
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Yet another software project Hitachi tackled in the 1960s was an
operating system for a project sponsored by MITI and Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone (NT&T) to build a very-large scale computer, called the HITAC
8700/8800 within Hitachi (the NT&T version, the 8800, was to be used for
telecommunications data processing). Development work for the software
started in 1968 at the Kanagawa Works and was then taken over by the
Software Works in 1969. The commercial operating system that resulted from
this project, OS7, had multi-processor, multi-virtual memory capabilities, as
well as supported large-scale batch processing, time sharing, and on-line
real-time computing. 29 The first commercial deliveries came in 1972-1973,
primarily to universities and research institutes. 3 0 The computer fell short
of several performance goals and was not nearly as powerful as the 370
series, which IBM introduced while the 8700/8800 was in development.
Nonetheless, the project provided Hitachi with extensive experience in
hardware architecture design, integrated-circuit logic chip design, and large-
scale software engineering. 3 1
Systems programs were not the only software orders to Hitachi during
this period. Since few companies in Japan outside of the computer
manufacturers had in-house software expertise, Hitachi and the other
mainframe producers had to design several large applications programs. In
Hitachi's case, these included a series of real-time reservations systems for
the Japan National Railways (the first programmable system Hitachi delivered
in 1964, with 1100 terminals throughout Japan); on-line currency-exchange
and deposit systems for the Tokai Bank (1965) and Sanwa Bank (1967); and
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real-time production control systems for Toyo Kogyo (Mazda) and Nissan
(1968) .32
The banking systems were particularly important, because most Japanese
banks at the time were buying these from IBM; Hitachi's system marked the
beginning of a shift to more domestic systems. 33 Developing the Tokai
software, which connected 200 remote terminals around Japan to a central
processing center in Nagoya, was a particularly difficult but valuable learning
experience, according to Sakata. Before taking on the job, he and other
Hitachi engineers spent nearly two months in the U.S. during 1963-1964 to
observe several American airline and banking systems, including Howard
Savings in New Jersey and Continental illinois in Chicago. They were
thoroughly dismayed at how difficult the programming looked and, once they
completed the initial Tokai system, it took a full year to get the software
working properly. Due to the contract terms, Hitachi was not paid for this
extra debugging time and had to absorb the costs itself. 3 4 The cost and
frustrations of this project made Sakata and other managers particularly
concerned about improving their ability to control schedules and time
estimates, as well as bugs.
B. Evolution of the Factory Strategy
During the late 1950s, engineers at Hitachi's Totsuka Works, including
Sakata, believed that, since computers relied on digital technology similar to
the telephone exchange equipment they were already manufacturing, Hitachi
would be able to manufacture computers independently. 3 5 This factory thus
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began hardware design in Hitachi, and also established the first group
officially responsible for software development (mainly language processors
and utility programs), the engineering service section. The section started
in 1960 with about 10 engineers and in 1963 was divided into two planning
sections, one for government and university business, and another for private
contracts. The concept of "service" was intimately linked to software since,
to sell computers, Hitachi had to learn from potential customers what their
needs were and then be able to provide adequate programs. Closely related
to this section was another group which trained technicians for
maintenance. 3 6
Hitachi management next decided to establish a separate computer
division in 1962 along with a new factory to manufacture hardware, the
Kanagawa Works (separated from the Totsuka Works). The hardware design
section in the new plant took charge of writing or revising software for the
new RCA machines Hitachi was planning to offer. But managers worried
that the dispersion of a scarce resource -- software engineers -- would
make it difficult to write software for the new 8000 series. This situation
then led to the creation of centralized system program department in the
Kanagawa plant, headed by Sakata and modeled after a similar department in
RCA.3 7 The new department formally brought together the group in the
Central Research Laboratory that had been developing software for the 5020;
the software engineers already in the Kanagawa Works; and a program
section at the division level (although physically located in the Kanagawa
Works) that had been studying programs for pre-Spectra series RCA machines
produced in apan. The core group consisted of about 60 engineers; Hitachi
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hired another 20 personnel, for a total of 80.38
Underlying the establishment of this department, according to the head
of the design section and Sakata's successor as department manager in 1969,
Fujinaka Satoshi, was also "the anticipation that we would develop software
as a factory product." With the 8000 series going on sale and software for
the 5020 yet to be delivered, noted Fujinaka, "Work was increasing so
rapidly that the new structure couldn't catch up with it. Every day was a
struggle with time." 3 9
The next logical step was a software factory. In fact, rapid growth of
the computer division caused acute shortages of space and personnel in both
the hardware and software areas. The building housing the Kanagawa Works,
located in Totsuka-cho, Yokohama, was expanded but this was still
insufficient. As a result, Hitachi established a separate facility for
peripherals (Odawara) in 1966 and purchased another site in Hadano, an hour
or so by train from Totsuka, where it built its current mainfram plant
(Kanagawa Works). The design and production departments moved to Hadano
in August 1968, leaving most of the company's software departments at
Totsuka (a few others, for some systems engineering and small-scale
computers, remained within the division's staff organization until later in the
1970s). In February 1969, the Totsuka building was officially upgraded to a
separate factory -- the first software facility in the world referred to as a
"factory. 40
According to the managers who operated the new factory, Komoto
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Yukio (the first head of the Software Works), Nakatani Nobuo (his
successor), and Sakata Kazuyuki (who served as deputy general manager
during the 1970s), there were two reasons for following this strategy: One
was the acute shortage of software engineers and the hope that centralizing
software development in a single facility would bring about an increase in
productivity. (Despite a nation-wide search for software engineers, they still
had considerably less than their target to staff the new factory in 1969.) A
second reason was their decision to stop treating software as simply an
engineering service that went along with hardware but to view it as a
separate product that could and should be produced and inspected in a
disciplined, factory environment. 4 1 This was not a casual decision; managers
discussed it at the highest levels of the company. Hitachi President Komai
made the final decision to establish the Software Works as an independent
factory, insisting that they maintain the tradition of factory profit centers.
A debate within Hitachi ensued over the nature and name of the new
facility; some engineers wanted to establish a "Software Center." But
President Komai intervened and ordered that they "call it a factory."42 This
was despite the fact that no other company in the world had established a
factory for' software production, and Japanese university professors criticized
Hitachi, maintaining that software was not sufficiently understood to be
produced through engineering and factory methods. 4 3
C. The Factory Architects
The key figure in the development of the factory's management-control
system was Sakata Kazuyuki, the individual who had served as manager for
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several key projects as well as for the system program department (currently
he is a senior managing director of Nippon Business Consultants, a Hitachi
software subsidiary). Sakata had entered Hitachi in 1941 from a technical
high school and gone to work as a machine operator in the Totsuka Works.
After additional training at Hitachi's in-house engineering school and a two-
year stint in the army, he joined Totsuka's production engineering
department in November 1945 and began developing standard times for
machining operations as well as studying job tasks, scheduling, and conveyor
systems to improve productivity. In 1957, Sakata moved to the accounting
department and got his first glimpse of a computer -- an IBM 421 tabulating
machine. In 1960, he was reassigned and made the manager of a new
computer inspection section, which had about 30 members. When Hitachi
management separated computer development from the Totsuka Works in 1962
and established the Kanagawa plant, Sakata continued as manager of the
inspection section, which was now located within the engineering department.
The following year he became head of the computer division's engineering
service department, which did systems engineering for Hitachi customers.
Then, in 1965, with the establishment of the system program department,
Sakata became responsible for software production and quality control.
Sakata's major frustrations were bugs in the software Hitachi was
receiving from RCA, and the shortage of programmers, which he had to
divide among the RCA machines, the 5020 project, and applications programs.
A dozen Hitachi hardware engineers not working on the 5020 learned how to
write software by studying and translating RCA's COBOL, FORTRAN, and
ASSEMBLER manuals for the HITAC 3010 and 4010 machines; seven or eight
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then continued in the system program department reviewing the new
programs from RCA amd correcting bugs before shipping the software to
Hitachi customers. This experience, as well as his background in hardware
production management and inspection, and in computer engineering service,
convinced Sakata that there had to be a better way to produce programs and
prevent breakdowns due to errors: setting the same quality standards for
software as for other Hitachi products, and rejecting the notion that the
nature of software was such that there would always be bugs. "Thus,"
Sakata recalled, "even though it was software, we called [the new facility] a
factory. "44
The key figure who became responsible for implementing Sakata's basic
ideas was Shibata Kanji, currently the head of the engineering department in
the Software Works. He first joined the engineering service section of
Hitachi's computer division in 1964 after majoring in electrical engineering at
Shinshu University, and later moved to the system program department and
then the production administration section of the Software Works.
Shibata quickly became the in-house expert on software-engineering
management soon after he joined Hitachi. One aspect of the company's
training program for new engineers required them to take several months
during their second year to write a paper on a theme related to their work,
and then give a presentation. Shibata chose to collect data on programmers
working on software for the RCA machines and the 5020 -- how much time
they spent each day on different activities and different types of programs.
Programmers did not like being watched closely or keeping records, recalled
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Shibata, so they stopped doing this in 1966. But Sakata, Shibata's supervisor
in the system program department, read his paper and decided this data was
too valuable not to collect. Sakata then hired female employees to keep the
records, which became the basis of the Software Works' production planning
and control system. 45
IV. POLICY AND MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE
A. Conceptualizing the Development Process
Hitachi engineers, despite the factory environment, conceived of the
software development process in much the same way as other software
engineers around the world: as primarily composed of design and testing
activities (see figure below). Data on man-power allocations (total number
of workers) per process at Hitachi Software Works ca. 1985 indicates this is
an accurate conceptualization: roughly 50 to 55% went into planning and
design, 5% to coding, 30-35% to debugging, and about 10% to inspection. 4 6
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A. SYSTEM SOFTWARE PROCESS FLOW
Development Process Inspection Process
Basic Design Initial Inspection Planning
Functional Design
Structural Design
Coding Documentation Planning
Stand-Alone Debugging
Combinational Debugging
Comprehensive Debugging Inspection Program Compilation
Final Product Inspection
B. CUSTOM APPLICATIONS SOFTWARE PROCESS FLOW
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System Proposal Compilation
Demon stration
Estimate
System Construction/Consultation
System Design
Program Implementation
Conversion
System Test
Follow-Up Service
But a distinguishing development at Hitachi was that, with the decision
to establish a software factory, managers became obligated to adopt
company-wide accounting and management procedures and thus innovate in
software engineering by devising systematic controls on the process flow,
costs, and product quality. In Hitachi's hardware factories, the management
systems evolved centering on standardization and components control.
Sakata and Shibata believed it was possible to apply the same concepts to
softwa re.
In particular, Shibata wanted programmers to design modules that would
serve as the equivalent of standardized hardware parts. "Around 1970 we
came to believe that we had to introduce a components control system
similar to what you find for hardware, and in the Software Works we
established a committee to take this up as a special project." The committee
members soon realized, however, that "software is not sufficiently
standardized to be treated the same as hardware components control." They
changed their priorities and decided that, first, they had to find a way to
standardize product design, just as this had been done in hardware
manufacturing, and then worry about components control. A special
committee then started establishing standards for all activities, while the
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original committee adopted the name "Structured Programming Methods
Committee," believing that structured programming techniques would provide
a way to standardize the software design process. Company engineers next
spent several years studying these techniques from available literature, as
well as analyzing programs Hitachi had already written to find ways to
improve the design structure. This was before structured programming
became discussed more widely in industry journals and adopted by other
companies .48
In addition to their central objective of standardization, the experience
of Sakata and other Hitachi managers in hardware production had encouraged
them to believe that improvements in productivity and quality (reductions in
bugs) were most likely to come from better tools and management systems.
In software, they viewed these as higher-level languages and modularization
for long-term maintenance, as well as visible charts and documentation for
better process control. Developing a "visualized" production control system
became an especially important goal, because software engineering did not
involve visible raw materials. To pursue these objectives, they decided to
analyze, and then attempt to manage, the overall process of software
development in much the same way as they saw hardware engineering and
manufacturing: They developed factory systems that provided controls for
production management, including man-power, process, quality, and product
controls; and for product engineering, including standardization, design, and
inspection. The controls involved a mixture of manual and automated
support-tools and systems, with strong efforts during the late 1970s and
1980s toward computer-integrated production. 4 9 (See Table)
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Initially, the motivation for pursuing factory-type production and
product-engineering systems was to be able to inspect software products, like
any other product Hitachi manufactured, and thereby be able to guarantee
quality. But a side benefit of the system of controls, according to Shibata,
turned out to be the "minimization of problems." This has resulted in
significant improvements in productivity, thus indirectly addressing the
shortage of skilled programmers. 50
B. The Factory Organization
The Software Works began with three design departments for distinct
types of programs: system development (systems engineering), system
programs (basic software), and on-line programs (large-scale real-time
applications programs for the National Railways, NT&T, banks, and other
industrial or insitutional customers). Administrative functions were similar
to those in hardware manufacturing plants: product planning, inspection,
engineering, accounting, and general affairs, as well as training. Hitachi
managers did not view the factory organization as static; over time, they
have consolidated some of these functional areas, added design departments
as software technology evolved (such as for artificial intelligence and
computer graphics), and centralized all large-scale custom applications
(railways, banking, industrial) development in a second facility, the Omori
Software Works (officially separated in 1985).
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HITACHI SOFTWARE WORKS: ORGANIZATION CHART, 196951
DESIGN DEPARTMENTS ADMINISTRATIVE SECTIONS
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT Administration
Design Groups (6) Inspection
Engineering
SYSTEM PROGRAMS Accounting and Control
Planning Group General Affairs
Design Groups (2)
ON-LINE PROGRAMS COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY SCHOOL
National Raliways (2 Groups)
NT&T (4 Groups)
Banking (2 Groups)
Government etc. (1 Group)
HITACHI SOFTWARE WORKS: ORGANIZATION CHART, 198652
Product Planning Department
OTHER DEPARTMENTS:
DESIGN DEPARTMENTS: Engineering
No. 1 Systems Programming Documentation/Manual Development
No. 2 Systems Programming NT&T Information Processing Systems
Database Programming Inspection
Data Communications Programming Computer Center Service
Language Processor Software Education Center
Artificial Intelligence General Administration
Computer Graphics Purchasing
Small-Scale Systems Programming Accounting and Control
Software Technology Center
In addition to overall organization, another flexible aspect of the
factory was the ability of managers to move personnel freely between among
groups within a department, such as if problems arose on a given project.
(Departments generally had between 500 and 600 people, with the NT&T
department being the largest (around 900); departments were then organized
into groups of about 100 programmers, with sub-groups of about 30
members.) Managers could also appeal to engineering groups within each
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department to add manpower to help solve project-related difficulties, or
they could appeal to the Engineering Department and the Software
Technology Center for problems or develop tools considered to have factory-
wide relevance.53
PRODUCT PLANNING
The Product Planning Department in the Software Works was launched
in 1970 to centralize planning activities dispersed among the system program
department, the large-scale program area, and the administration (control)
section. Responsibilities included planning for products such as new
operating systems, beginning with OS7, but also for exports. In 1974, for
example, the department set up promotion conferences to determine policy
for Hitachi's M series, which Hitachi was designed to compete directly with
the IBM 370 family. These activities included preparing for OEM exports to
Itel in the U.S. and studying how to make the Hitachi hardware fully IBM
compatible. To assist in this effort, Hitachi also established in 1972 a
Computer Liason Office in Mountain View, California, which the Product
Planning Department in the Software Works administered directly. This
office served as an "information pipeline" on IBM, replacing RCA, and in
1978 was absorbed by the San Francisco office of Hitachi America. 5 4 In the
late 1970s, the department became involved in product pricing as Hitachi
unbundled software from hardware, and in administration of overseas
technical contracts. 5 5
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ENGINEERING (PRODUCTION ADMINISTRATION)
This department originated in the engineering department, software
section, of the Kanagawa Works, and was moved in 1970 to the Software
Works. It began with two sections (engineering and administration) and 36
members. The engineering section served largely as a liason group for the
computer division, other Hitachi factories, and subcontractors, providing
explanations and documentation on software-product pricing and progress on
product development. The administration section was responsible for
production management and process control (scheduling), as well as
administration of the computer and software centers attached to the factory.
This group set standard times and was responsbile for cost control and
studying software productivity. It also helped develop control systems to
monitor design and inspection, as well as other tools, in conjunction with
the System Development Laboratory (established in 1975) and the Software
Technology Center (established in 198X). General-use tools were always paid
for out of the factory budget. Other sections of the original engineering
department later became full departments: procurement, which purchased
software from overseas and Japanese subcontractors; and the
documentation/manuals section.56
INSPECTION
This department originated with the Software Works and has followed
the strategy of developing inspection and control techniques based on actual
operating data. The manager of this department reports directly to the
factory head, as in all Hitachi factories. In addition to overseeing all testing
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and debugging, an important tool has been the "needle probe," to identify
bugs while a program is in development and provide data to revise estimates
and formulate countermeasures to correct the problems. The inspection
department also operated the SST, established in 1977, which simulated user
conditions and used input/output and circuit defect generators to detect
bugs; organized the design review task forces, which include reviewers from
several different departments, including inspection; evaluated the performance
of programs at customer locations; took charge of maintenance; compiled
information on bugs and developed methods of testing for potential defects
and developed the factory's bug forecasting system. In addition, the
department had responsibilities for programmer training and helped develop
support tools.57
ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL
The members of this department set up and have maintained the
factory's cost accounting system. 'A major problem in the beginning was
how to treat orders, sales, and income. Management then decided to total
development expenses for systems software after a project's completion and
then charge these back to the Kanagawa Works. Payments for applications
programs for customers were included with the hardware; the Software Works
received payments by submitting in-house order tickets. Essential to the
calculations were the standard times for all software development activities,
set by the engineering (production administration) department.58
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SYSTEMS ADMINISTRATION (OMORI SOFTWARE WORKS)
This department originated in 1973, from the computer division's
systems consultation department, which developed large-scale applications
programs for the government and private customers. Fujimoto, the head of
the Software Works, and Sakata, the deputy general manager, moved this
divisional department to the Software Works as part of their effort to
centralize and standardize design activities, in preparation for the
introduction of the first M-series mainframes in 1974, which required
additional personnel to rewrite programs to run on them. The institution of
SC (system consultation) standard times corresponded to the move of this
department to the Software Works. The department also took over
responsibilities for financial controls for leased systems. 5 9 Hitachi then
moved the systems administration department to the Omori, Tokyo site, and
in 1985 made this a separate factory for applications programs.
C. Product Engineering and Production Management
MANPOWER CONTROL
The basic tool for manpower control in Hitachi's software factories is
standard times for all phases of the development process, beginning with
basic design. Since the establishment of the Software Works, a committee of
Hitachi managers has revised these once per year, to keep up with
improvements in programmer productivity. This attempt to study and
discipline an engineering activity began in the mid-1960s, when programmers
in the Kanagawa Works began recording data on computer time and personnel
required to develop particular programs. Guided by Shibata, Hitachi engineers
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had enough actual data and confidence by 1967 to establish formal
procedures for estimating both labor and machine hours for program
development, initially placing this information on job tickets. The
inauguration of the Software Works in 1969 then made it necessary to adhere
to Hitachi's company-wide budgeting and cost-accounting procedures, which
used standard times as basic accounting units for all engineering and
production activities.
"We were perplexed," recalled Sakata, but they set up a committee that
succeeded in drawing up formal standard times for each activity and for
each class of programmers, based on their training and experience. The
standard times consisted of debugged program steps per day or month, and
took into account factors such as the type of program being written and the
language being used. They collected the data in a "red book" that became,
in the early 1970s, the basis for the factory's current cost accounting and
planning systems. Hitachi instituted these controls for software several
years before IBM began promoting the use of standard times, although the
System Development Corporation had published some materials discussing how
to devise standard times for software during 1967-1968 and these provided
several suggestions to Shibata. 60
Hitachi managers early on realized that systems software development
required a different set of activities than customized applications software.
To deal with this problem, they established SC (system consultation) standard
times in 1973.61 The systems engineering groups also developed separate
tools and systems such as HIPACE (Hitachi Phased Approach for High
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Productive Computer System Engineering) to standardize their proposals and
to aid in design automation. The evolution of different standards and tools
made it relatively easy to move the applications departments to the
independent Omori site.
Planning and scheduling improved significantly soon after the factory
was established, through the compilation of actual data for each phase of
the development process, and continual refinement of planning techniques.
Accurate programmer classifications were considered essential to both the
planning and budgeting systems, which, for each project, took into account
the experience and potential output of team members. Programmer
classifications were determined largely but not entirely by their length of
service in the company. Seniority was a fairly accurate indicator of
performance, according to Sakata, because actual data showed that coding
speed increased markedly with experience. But, at any given time, only
between 20 and 30 percent of programmers actually met standard times, and
it generally took 2 to 3 years to reach standard times for coding (and longer
for design).
Programmers were also tested before managers raised their official
classifications. They were made to take certain courses, and then tested at
the completion of each course. In addition, all programmers twice a year
were tested through competion in contests, where they had to write flow
charts and code to solve certain problems. The contests involved both
individuals and groups, and management recorded the results in a data base
as a reference for future planning and scheduling. 62
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PROCESS CONTROL
Establishing a capability for accurate planning and process control were
his most enduring problems, claimed Sakata. These were especially important
because Hitachi's computer division sales department would always announce
new computer products and give out specifications before the Software
Works had developed the systems software. This placed a tremendous burden
on software managers to meet their targets. Customers also wrote their own
applications programs, based on the advance specifications, and became very
upset if the systems software was delayed or if Hitachi changed the
specifications.
The Software Works' process-control system monitors the status of each
project through documents covering the first half of the development
process. Large projects include several hundred people, divided into teams of
about thirty with responsibilities parcelled out equally to team members.
Time and manpower estimates rely on actual data for past projects, including
the annually revised standard times.
For example, scheduling for a given project first involves the system
architects determining the general functional specifications and how many
program steps this will take. This is the most difficult part of scheduling,
according to Shibata, and thus the most error prone. Then they look to
standard times data for each phase of the development process and calculate
a standard time objective for the entire project. They next look at the skill
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levels and particular programming experiences of the employees available for
the project. Using the standard times as a reference, they work out a
schedule based on required program steps, man-months adjusted for skill and
experience levels, and computer time.
At the inception of the factory, managers began using simple arrow
diagrams and then a computerized diagramming tool, PERT Network System
(PNET), to keep track of projects and draw up a master schedule. Hitachi
linked this experimentally with a planning simulation program in 1971, HICAP
(Hitachi Computer-Aided Planning). It did not prove to be especially
accurate, however, and involved other problems. Most serious was that
letting the computer control the schedule was too lax, since parts of a
program often have to be completed before other work can continue;
managers preferred to deal with these types of problems through personal
negotiations. In addition, during project progress meetings (formalized in
1973-1974 and which met once a month to discuss problems and potential
solutions), they found it convenient to use arrow diagrams on paper, because
of all the schedule changes they usually made. Hitachi thus went back to
manually written arrow diagrams for process planning, until the factory
introduced CAPS as an on-line production control system in 1978 to track
the actual progress of completing modules and documentation, and of
debugging and design review. This system involved the assignment of every
programmer to a specific terminal as well as a central data base to keep
track of the process flow, mainly through the completion of documentation. 63
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In the debugging process, the basic control mechanism has been check
lists, which indicate problems and progress toward solutions, including 'from
1973-1974 a system of tickets. (or tags) for accompanying documents.6 4
Hitachi used PX tickets to accompany daily-control charts during debugging,
and PY tickets for daily control charts during inspection. PZ tickets
accompanied control charts identifying specific defects or bugs, while PW
tickets designated control charts used during planning, design, and coding.
Other tickets indicated the state of work-in-process, and progress in
correcting defects. Overall monitoring of the debugging process was also
incorporated within CAPS. 65
To determine what percentage of a project has been completed,
managers submit reports on completion of modules. If a program is designed
to have 100 modules, for example, and 80 are completed, then they consider
the project 80% done. 66 One of the results of the control systems used at
the Software Works is that, if projects are falling behind, managers can add
people -- not just anyone, but the best people available -- and generally
finish close to the target. This was because the factory environment
facilitated rapid understanding of projects.67 In contrast, IBM's experiences
with the 360 operating system development was that adding people tended to
make projects later, due to the communication time needed to familiarize
new personnel.6 8
QUALITY CONTROL
Hitachi engineers defined quality control for software as, first,
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preventing the creation of bugs in the design stage, and, second, meeting
performance specifications. These two factors directly impact the customer
and so, according to Shibata, are given primary importance. Other features
of quality that affect the manufacturer are maintainability and portability of
a program. 69 To improve quality control, Sakata, Shibata, and other
factory managers decided to focus on the adoption of structured design
methods, high-level languages, and formal systems for quality control,
process control, and product engineering. These tools facilitated long-term
maintenance as well as short-term productivity by making it possible to
divide job tasks more easily and to test completed modules and programs.
From 1971, the factory instituted control charts indicating the
generation of bugs and status of corrections, as well as a "needle probe"
technique, developed by Sakata, to test a program being developed when
about 60% was completed, and then revise the overall bug estimates. 70 In
1972, Hitachi added another ticket-control system: P tickets to designate
program changes, and B tickets to indicate corrects of bugs. In 1974, these
were linked to the PX-PW-PZ process-control ticket system, to simplify
project control and estimating. At the same time, the needle probe tool and
data on actual bug generation for different types of programs became the
basis of a time-series statistical program for forecasting bugs instituted in
1975, FORCST. This also provided programmers with examples of bugs in
different types of software, to help them avoid making similar errors. 7 1
Included as part of the quality control effort were also design review
sessions from around 1974 (particularly used for applications programs where
Hitachi had to meet customer specifications).72 In addition, the system-
43
L__I_
gleaning practices, focusing on particular system design problems and
solutions that seemed instructive to present to all employees in the Software
Works, supplemented other quality assurance activities.
PRODUCT CONTROL
This consisted of a formal system, started by the system program
department in the Kanagawa Works, for both storing program source files
and accompanying documentation for future reference, either to correct bugs
or to add enhancements. In 1976, Hitachi started the practice of keeping
copies of all programs in a separate location to guard against destruction
from earthquakes or accidents. 7 3
STANDARDIZATION
In addition to standard times, from the inception of the Software
Works, Hitachi managers made "job standardization" a top priority. They did
not establish long-term fixed standards, because personnel and technology
were changing continually. But the standards establishment committee
initially met almost weekly to determine what short-term work standards
should be and codified these as the Hitachi Software Standards (HSS). This
entire effort involved a deliberate attempt to standardize software as Hitachi
factories standardized the development and production of material products;
specifically, managers tried to prevent programmers from designing, coding,
and documenting software products in different ways. In Shibata's opinion,
standardization of the entire process flow was probably the most important
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technique Hitachi found to raise productivity, particularly when combined
with high-level languages and group-programming support systems such as
CAPS. The fewer bugs that resulted was one advantage; another was that
standardized documentation made inspection easier. 7 4
According to the official factory history, the standardization effort was
extremely difficult and not very successful at first. Over time, however,
factory managers succeeded: The effort depended on the establishment of a
structured design method in 1973 to facilitate program maintenance and
portability, despite the lengthier programs that often resulted. 7 5 At the
same time, the factory instituted a standardized "components [modules]
control system" and then in 1977 a general-use software tools registration
and control system. Meanwhile, the factory published standard coding
manuals for each programming language used in the facility.7 6
The structured programming method Hitachi adopted began with a
standardized approach to design: (1) determination of user requirements; (2)
determination of external specifications (the program's logic structure); (3)
determination of internal specifications (the program's "physical" structure);
(4) manufacturing (coding); and (5) inspection (testing and debugging). The
logic structure represented the functional layers of a program and the
interconnections (input/output) between those layers. First, programmers
wrote specifications in natural language and used an in-house tool, CEG
(Cause-Effect Graph), and decision tables to identify inconsistencies or flaws
in the logic structure. They then broke down the object function into
partial functions to develop algorithms to implement the desired
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specifications. The physical structure represented the actual modules making
up the program (their hierarchical arrangement as well as interconnections)
and data (data hierarchies, data and module interconnections, and data-point
relationships).
Hitachi's major design objectives were (1) to match the physical
structure as closely as possible to the logic structure; (2) to standardize the
physical structure; and (3) to make the elements of the physical structure as
independent as possible. This latter principle required each module to have
only one input and one output, and each module to be in effect a "closed
subroutine." Documentation also followed a standardized format. In addition,
several support tools relied directly on the standardized design structures.
AGENT (Automated Generator of External Test Cases), for example,
automatically generated test items from the cause-effect diagrams and served
as a logic-design support tool. ADDS (Automated Design and Documentation
System) served as a design-support tool for the physical structure by
analyzing design information and generating documents in graphic form. 77
Related to standardization was the capability to reuse modules
developed for both system and applications programs. Since standard times
did not assume a programmer would reuse software, doing this allowed
programmers to meet or surpass standard times, and helped managers meet
cost or scheduling targets more easily than without reusing modules.
Potential reusability was considered at the very beginning of designing a
program, and facilitated through the standardization of design through
structured programming.
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The tradeoffs, according to Shibata, involved performance and
enhancements; structured programs designed to contain reusable parts did not
always perform as well as newly written programs. In fact, a general rule
Hitachi used was that, if they had to revise 30% of the code in a module,
then, in terms of functional performance, it was better to write the module
needed from scratch. Only in 1985 did Hitachi managers require programmers
to start keeping data on how much code they were reusing, although survey
data in the previous paper ranked Hitachi in the high category for this
measure, exceeded only by Toshiba, which was over 50% (See Appendix table
on "Reusability Analysis"). For new releases of systems software, the
reusability rate was about 90%.78 The most opportunities for reusability,
however, Hitachi viewed as being in applications programs.
In addition, considered as part of the standardization and reusability
effort were a series of systems to facilitate the transfer of programs among
different machines. HIPAL (Hitachi Program Application Library), an on-line
data base of applications programs and utilities, was first set up within the
computer division in 1968 and then transferred to the Software Works in
1970. A tool for translating programs for different machines, HITRAN
(Hitachi Translation Program Library), was separated from the HIPAL system
in 1977. Both of these were for in-house use. HILINK (Hitachi Users'
Program Library Network) was a separate system launched in 1975 that made
it possible for Hitachi customers to exchange programs they had written. 79
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TRAINING
Training was integral to standardization and the general success of the
factory effort. Consequently, an education program was set up along with
the Software Works. Hitachi hired both software engineers who had studied
in the U.S., as well as high-school graduates which the company had to train
itself. But the expansion of Software Works personnel from 348 in 1969 to
over 900 in 1971 created a severe strain on instructors; a temporary solution
was to make greater use of large meetings, as well as use the results of
tests based on the Hitachi Software Standards and contests among the
programmers, to judge the abilities of programmers. 80 Managers recorded
the results of these tests and contests and used them (along with length-of-
service information) to classify programmers as an aid in estimating time and
cost schedules. 8 1
The education and classification scheme extended for 12 years in
Hitachi, after which individuals received the grade of chief programmer or
system engineer, depending on whether they were in systems software or
applications software. During the first year in the Software Works,
employees were classified as trainees and took courses in introductory
computer science and basic programming. They remained classified as
"junior" programmers or system engineers from the second through fifth
years in the factory, during which time they received additional courses.
Programmers with between six and ten years of experience were designated
junior leaders and received middle-level courses. Between their nineth and
tenth years, programmers rose to the status of planners or sub-leaders, while
undergoing advanced training. Chief programmers continued their education
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and studied subjects such as software reliability, use of design review,
semiconductors, and computer network technology. 82
V. TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: COMPUTER-AIDED TOOLS
AND SYSTEMS
The initial essence of the factory infrastructure at Hitachi was
primarily a combination of policies to promote standardization and the use of
"good" practices such as structured design. A technological infrastructure to
facilitate division of labor and group programming evolved afterward, largely
in response to several problems in software management that appeared to
defy complete solution through management alone. A Hitachi memorandum
cited six areas of specific concern:
1. The invisible nature of the production process
2. Increasing scale, complexity, and diversification of program functions
3. Pressure for higher reliability
4. Difficulty of improving production efficiency
5. Shortage of software designers, especially experienced designers, and
managers
6. Increased work hours for management. 8 3
The response engineers at Hitachi's Systems Development Laboratory
and at the Software Works arrived at during the late 1970s was to develop
computer-aided systems for functional support (such as design, coding, and
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testing) and group programming in general. The factory's policies for
standardization, design, and inspection functions for systems software were
integrated through CASD (Computer-Aided Software Development System);
and the policies for man-power, process, and quality control through CAPS
(Computer-Aided Production Control System for Software). Both CASD and
CAPS relied on various subsystems or support tools, and standardized
methods. They themselves also evolved into a broader effort labelled ICAS
(Integrated Computer-Aided Software Engineering System), aimed at fully
integrating product-engineering and production-management tools and
activities.8 4 The System Development Laboratory has directed the
development of these technologies, with the cooperation of the Engineering
Department in the Software Works in areas related to production and quality
control .85
A. Computer-Aided Software Development System (CASD)
CASD was mainly a response to the increasing size and complexity of
software programs and grew out of a design and debugging tool Hitachi
developed dring 1975-1977 to centralize controls for supporting and
standardizing design through the use of structured programming, high-level
languages for system construction, multiple and remote computer sites, and a
central program library. 8 6 After 1979 it became also a tool for reliability
improvement, evolving increasingly in parallel and with linkages to CAPS,
which standardizes a variety of technologies and activities to improve
control over manpower planning and scheduling as well as cost, process
flows, and quality.8 7
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There were two basic assumptions underlying CASD: One was that
labor productivity in software could be improved by standardizing the tasks
in each phase of development and then utilizing support tools. Second was
that performance could be improved not only through standardization but
also through automating these support tools for each phase of the
development process and then integrating them into a single system. This
was an attempt, in the words of the architects of the system, to "modernize"
as much as possible of what has usually been considered a manual activity,
supported only with tools for discrete parts of the development process. 8 8
Structurally, CASD included three interconnected support subsystems,
for design, programming, and testing. The design-support subsystem
constructed the design documentation and analyzed the design specifications.
The programming-support subsystem made it possible to write the system
using a high-level language, and analyzed the results. The testing-support
subsystem then helped devise the test items and run the program being
tested, as well as evaluate the comprehensiveness of the tests after they
were run.
The design-support subsystem relied on a structured-programming tool
called Automated Design and Documentation System (ADDS) as well as
Hitachi's Module Design Language (MDL). MDL made it possible to
standardize and formalize design specifications at the module level; the ADDS
system placed this documentation, as well as corrections or changes, into a
central database, and checked for obvious errors, thereby assisting in the
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design review process. Printers and terminals provided the capability to
"visualize" the design documentation. The tables and charts produced by
ADDS covered areas such as the functional layered structure of a program,
module specifications, the data flow path, module connections, and summaries
of the modules, functions, and changes. 89
The programming-support subsystem relied on a standardized language
for coding, the Hitachi Programming Language (HPL). This also facilitated
design review. HPL's main components were a compiler and what Hitachi
called the Static Code Analaysis (SCAN) system. Coding reviews were
supposed to catch program bugs as early as possible and also provide a way
to examine the program logic. Hitachi engineers were frustrated because
this was largely a manual process, and was affected significantly by the
different levels of ability of the programmers. To address these problems,
the SCAN system received static-code analysis data from the HPL compiler
and put out various reports for use in the coding review. These reports
analyzed the program control structure in graphic form, the program's data
structure, and the module control structure and relationship between modules
and data. Then, SCAN checked the results of these analyses with design
information from ADDS. 9 0
The testing-support subsystem was intended to tackle problems of
quality control and productivity simultaneously by facilitating the
identification of bugs and, correspondingly, the reduction of man-hours
devoted to testing. This subsystem had four objectives. One was to clarify
in detail the design specifications, on the assumption that the test items had
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to determine the conformance of the program to its specifications. Another
was to establish testing standards for a given program, recognizing that it
was impossible to test all potential operating conditions. In addition, the
subsystem was designed to automate as much of the testing process as
possible, as well as evaluate the comprehensiveness of the tests. Several
other tools -- Cause and Effect Graphs (CEG), Automated Generator of
External Test Cases (AGENT), HPL Test and Debugging system (HPLTD), and
Test Coverage Manager (TESCO) -- were integrated within the system to
perform these objectives. 9 1
B. Computer-Aided Production Control System (CAPS)
As with CASD, CAPS development was inspired by several persistent
problems. Hitachi managers wanted greater standardization and control of
the process flow, delivery times, quality, and overall costs. In particular,
CAPS focused on the following areas:
1. Collection and analysis of management or process-control data in
accordance with the structure of a program
2, Chronological analysis of each type of process-control data
3. Imposition of controls on the process limits of design documentation
4. Japanese character and graphic output through a non-impact printer
5. Multifaceted quality analysis
6. Construction of a data base for actual data and standard times
7. Automatic collection of data
8. Capability for on-line instantaneous utilization of the automated
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output. 92
The manual procedures and computer-aided production-control tools
introduced at the Kanagawa Works and then the Software Works between
1967 and 1976 provided the foundation for CAPS, of which Hitachi completed
an initial version between 1977 and 1980, by establishing a formal means of
collecting and analyzing both historical and current data on programmer
productivity and project management. The incremental evolution of these
management policies and tools is clearly evident in the following chronology
of major milestones preceding the start of CAPS development:9 3
1967 Completion of a system for computing labor and machine hours for
software development (Kanagawa Works)
1969 Establishment of standard times for software development (Software
Works)
1971 Establishment of programmer ability coefficients and amendments of
standard times
Completion of an estimation and budget system using standard times
and a simulation system for resource planning
Completion of a PERT Network System (PNET), an automatic
diagramming system for schedule control
Implementation of a manual system for time-series analysis of test
processing and quality control
1972 Completion of a system for budget-vs.-actual expenditure control for
man-hours and machine-hours for each project and department
Implementation of a manual system for document schedule control
1973 Implementation of a manual system for job process control
Implementation of a manual system for productivity analysis and
control
1974 Completion of a productivity analysis system for each project and
department
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1975 Implementation of a manual system for defect factor analysis and
quality control
1976 Development of a time-series statistical program for forecasting defects
(FORCST)
Establishment of a standard scheduling system
Implementation of structured design methods
Central to CAPS was the standardization and clarification of program
structures; this the factory accomplished by requiring programmers to use
structured design methods. But successful implementation of the computer-
aided features of the control system depended equally on several
improvements in hardware technology. One was high-performance computing
power, so that numerous programmers could be on terminals connected to the
same data bases; this was done by installing Hitachi's largest mainframes, the
M-180 and M-200H. CAPS also demanded increased storage capacity for the
historical data base recording past data and present data, and comparing
these with standard times; this came through another Hitachi product, MSS
(Mass Storage System). To use MSS efficiently required a large-scale data-
base management system; Hitachi filled this gap with the development of
several systems, most notably ADM (Adaptable Data Manager). Managers
also wanted simple visual graphic output, to make it easier to follow the
process flow; this was achieved through the use of non-impact laser beam
printers that printed Japanese characters as well as English. In addition,
managers wanted to formalize the development process for new software
products and then shorten the time needed for program development; Hitachi
has been most successful in accomplishing this in the applications area, with
a series of procedures and tools such as EAGLE and HIPACE, as well as
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CORAL (Customer-Oriented Application Program Development System), and
CANDO (a prototyping tool). These are used primarily in Omori and
applications subsidiaries. 94
An example of this mixing of management policy and computer
technology can be seen in the incorporation of standard times into CAPS.
Controlling programmer time and machine time was considered critical
because, according to Shibata and Yokoyama, these accounted for over 90%
of software production costs. Sakata had earlier decided it was necessary to
establish standard-time estimates for man-days and computer time. Shibata
and his contemporaries, however, wanted to incorporate these into a
computerized system that would enable Hitachi to follow the time estimates
more closely in the actual production process. Standard times required,
first, determining job standards and, second, classifying programmers by
ability; managers such as Shibata wanted to be comprehensive but stressed
that standard times be as simple as possible, so they would be easy to revise
as well as to simulate, while still covering most of the appropriate criteria.
To facilitate the accuracy and utilization of the standard times, for each
project, estimates and actual data were fed as the project progressed into a
central production data base from on-line terminals. This made it possible
to compare progress to estimates and revise estimates during the project.
Under CAPS ca. 1980, data points included the following:
1. type of object machine (large, medium, small, peripheral)
2. type of program (control program, on-line user control, generator,
simulator, etc.
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3. process phase (basic design, functional design, etc.)
4. degree of difficulty (newness)
5. production volume (number of steps)
6. language being used (assembler, COBOL, FORTRAN, etc.)
7. machine being used
In addition, cost overruns- and late deliveries were the result, Shibata
and Yokoyama believed, of inaccurate daily scheduling and planning. To
correct this problem, Hitachi engineers wrote an algorithm to calculate
manpower needs and schedules automatically. This took two factors into
consideration: (1) actual working hours of the committed programmers; (2)
the minimum necessary times required for different phases for each type of
software program and standard times. Another assumption at Hitachi was
that there was a relationship between the progress of a software project and
its quality; an ideal system would thus integrate production management and
quality control data. Therefore, they designed CAPS to estimate
automatically the number of defects likely for each phase of development,
according to the type of program, number of steps, items tested, and other
factors, based on actual data. 95
CAPS relied completely on the use of structured programming
techniques, and then used this design technology to make the structure of
programs visible. A data base control system designed for structured
programs divided into modules, ADM (Adaptable Data Manager), automatically
checked actual progress versus estimates, as each module of a program was
completed. ADM then produced a detailed printout tracking the schedules for
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design, testing, and inspection, with additional information on documentation
and quality (errors in the specifications, design documents, or manuals; bugs
found in test items and coding; analysis of the causes of bugs and
countermeasures). Three subsystems -- for documentation daily-schedule
control, testing preparations and programming progress control, and testing,
bugging, and inspection progress control -- were also integrated within CAPS
and provided additional printouts with information and anlysis. In this
sense, CAPS was more than just a system for production management that
provided a visual capability for process monitoring; it also analyzed data and
served as a tool for quality control. 9 6
As a production and quality control system, CAPS was not fully
integrated with CASD but was developed in parallel. For example, CASD
output files were not automatically sent to the CAPS production database
source file; nor did CASD automatically send corrected modules to CAPS.
Automating the information flow was, however, a major area of development
and central to the ICAS program. 97 For example, between 1980 and 1983,
Hitachi completed links between the two systems making it possible to
register program modules in the CAPS program library automatically from
CASD, and to automatically feed data on bugs from CASD to CAPS.98
C. Integrated Computer-Aided Software En gineering System (ICAS)
ICAS also represented a mixture of technology and standardized
methods and procedures), but was aimed at incorporating even more advanced
methods and computer-aided tools. It contained four main features: (1) an
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integrated methodology for the structuring and abstraction of software, using
a formal language and graphic notation, throughout a life cycle defined as
need analysis, requirement definition, planning, programming, testing,
operation and maintenance; (2) interactive tools for each phase of the life-
cycle; (3) an "intelligent" workbench, using a personal computer, allowing
programmers to use the tools by having dialogues with the computers; and
(4) complete management of information for all phases using a relational
database. The basic philosophy of this approach was to develop not
"methodology-free" tools, leaving it up to the user to decide on which
development methodology to employ, but to present computer-aided tools
with a "fixed development methodology of multi-purpose use," allowing users
to develop software quickly by using the tools "without having to worry
about which methodology to apply."
Requirements definition involved stepwise refinement in the procedural,
functional, and logical description of the system being designed. From the
conceptual model, programmers determined the control structure, abstracted
data and formed data modules, and defined functional algorithms with only
three control elements -- sequence, repetition, and selection -- using PDL or
PAD (Problem Analysis Diagrams). ICAS then automatically converted the
functional algorithm into statements written in a programming language.
Several tools simplified needs analysis and description (PPDS--Planning
Procedure to Develop Systems and FRAME--Formalized Requirements Analysis
Method), and requirements definition (RDL/RD (Requirement Definition
Language/Analyzer).
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Design-aid tools included ADDS (Automated Design and Documentation
System) and MDL (Module Design Language), already part of CASD, as well
as PDL/PAD (Problem Design Language/Problem Analysis Diagram). PDL/PAD
was intended to automate coding and completely integrate design
documentation and source programs. It consisted of a program logic design
tool, based on structured programming, and a tool to convert automatically
design documents into high-level language source programs (PL/1), or vice-
versa. In addition, DBDS (Database Design System) was a tool for designing
databases. Test-aid tools included AGENT, TESCO, and CEG, discussed
above. A Software Engineering Workbench (SEWB) and a Software
Engineering Database (SEDB) provided an infrastructure to use these tools
in an integrated manner. The relational database stored all data from each
tool input into the computer. 9 9
The quality control portions of ICAS were in actual operation in the
Software Works as of 1986 as part of CASD. Other subsystems of ICAS
being refined at the Systems Development Laboratory, Hitachi Software
Works, and Omori Software Works were already in use for applications
software. Most important were HIPACE, the set of procedures and
methodologies to guide system design, and EAGLE (Effective Approach to
Achieving High Level Software Productivity), an automated system-
development support tool. 10 0 Even before complete integration within the
ICAS project, HIPACE provided a factory-type methodological infrastructure
and EAGLE a factory-type technological interface for applications
development; managers at Hitachi's Omori facility and at Hitachi Software
Engineering also viewed these tools as factory systems.101
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Hitachi intended HIPACE to reduce costs in customized applications
development by facilitating communication between the company's system
engineers and customers and applying well-defined, standardized procedures
to system development and project management. The process flow was
simply analysis; sytem planning; system design; program design; program
construction; test; transfer (to customer); operation and evaluation. First,
engineers used Structured Data Flow diagrams (SDF) to analyze customer
needs. Planning Procedure to Develop System (PPDS) and Standard Procedure
to Develop Systems (SPDS) then provided documentation and project-
management standards for each phase of the development process. A set of
worksheets referred to as Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) provided the
format for planning of the actual design, programming, and testing tasks.
To facilitate long-term maintenance and reliability (and reusability),
engineers then used HIPACE-SA for structured analysis, HIPACE-SD for
structured design, and HIPACE-SP for structured programming (usually in
COBOL or P1).102
The EAGLE system extended the HIPACE methodology by adding four
computer-aided functions: (1) conversational language processing from system
design through testing, using easily understandable menus; (2) a central
database on design specifications and program implementation, as well as
project management (tracking information from the standardized work sheets
defined in the SPDS manual) to facilitate system development and
maintenance; (3) automated construction of new source programs from
standardized patterns ("skeletons") and components (sub-routines); and (4)
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automatic compilation of maintenance documentation.
The process flow in using EAGLE was also clearly defined. The first
two steps are the analysis of data types and interrelationships and their
recording in a "data dictionary" database; this is followed by registration of
the system design and program documentation in a specifications database.
At this point, new standardized modules are identified and registered in a
central program parts library, and existing components are identified for the
system being developed, if applicable. This makes it possible to "assemble"
programs using the new and reused modules. (Hitachi also makes these
standardized modules available as products with the EAGLE systems it sells
to customers, although company engineers have found that "data modules"
are easier to use than processing algorithms, which tend to be more difficult
to standardize.) EAGLE next generates an outline of the program from the
detailed (module-level) specifications and then produces a source program.
The source program is then edited to add particular functions wanted by
individual users. Finally, test commands are automatically generated and
carried out in conversational language (Japanese). 1 03
Recent efforts (1984-1986) to develop the EAGLE system have focused
on making it both more flexible for meeting customer needs as well as more
appropriate to a factory environment stressing division of labor and maximal
use of standardized components. One the one hand, the conversational
interface has been improved; and the system now handles PL/1 and CORAL
(Customer-Oriented Application Program Development System -- a Hitachi
language for writing specifications in Japanese), in addition to COBOL. New
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software rakes it possible for customers to design their own menus, rather
than rise c:nly the ones Hitachi provides, to add unique features to programs
being con!stru:ted. The system also can now be used to construct data-base
and data--corimunications programs, in addition to business-applications
prog rams.
On the cither hand, EAGLE has been modified to work more smoothly in
a time-sheirinq environment, to allow more people to divide up the tasks of
system development and have better access to the library of reusable
components .1 044 The overall result, according to Hitachi data, is that
programs designed with EAGLE generally show a 2.2-fold improvement in
"productivity" (Hitachi usually measures this by lines of code per programmer
in a giver; time period). As indicated in the table below, EAGLE also has
shifted mre i;ffort into system design and substantially reduced necessary
for testin:g. For a hypothetical program taking a year to develop without
EAGLE, this would mean a reduction in development time to 5.4 months,
with testingc being reduced from 4.8 to 1.4 months and program
implementation from 4.8 to 1.9 months.
Without EAGLE With EAGLE105
Developmelnt 100 (12 months) 45 (5.4 months)
System
Design 20% (2.4) 38% (2.1)
Program
Implementtioui 40o (4.8) 36% (1.9)
Test 40% (4.8) 26% (1.4)
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VI. ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY THROUGH SUBSIDIARIES
Where Hitachi has needed more organizational or geographic diversity
to meet customer needs than its two software factories provided, it has
relied on approximately 23 subsidiaries. The largest were Nippon Business
Consultants (ca. 2500 employees), established in 1959; Hitachi Software
Engineering (ca. 2400 employees), established in 1969; and Hitachi Micro-
Computer Engineering (ca. 1500 employees), established in 1982.106 Hitachi
classified these firms into ten groups, with several overlapping:
(1) General systems and applications software houses(Nippon Business Consultants, Hitachi Software Engineering, Hitachi
Information Networks, Hitachi Computer Consultants, Hitachi
Computer Engineering; and the regional companies Hitachi Chugoku
Software, Hitachi Tohoku Software, Hitachi Chubu Software, Hitachi
Nishibu Software)
(2) Industrial-use control systems(Hitachi Industrial Engineering, Hitachi Process Computer
Engineering, Hitachi Control Systems)
(3) Semiconductor and micro-computer software(Hitachi VLSI Engineering, Hitachi Micro-Computer Engineering)
(4) Information-processing and telecommunications systems(Hitachi Electronic Service, Hitachi Communications)
(5) Video and audio equipment, and personal-computer systems and software(Hitachi Video)
(6) Semiconductors and electronic devices(Hitachi Electronic Devices)
(7) Precision instruments software(Hitachi Instruments Engineering)
(8) Automotive electronics
(Hitachi Automotive Engineering)
(9) Robotics, control equipment, and business personal computers(Hitachi Kyoba Engineering)
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(10) Personal Computers(Hitachi Micro-Software Systems)
A brief discussion of Hitachi Software Engineering reinforces the notion
that the Hitachi group has managed to combine flexibility in serving
customer needs with a disciplined engineering and manufacturing approach to
software development. In contrast to Hitachi's two in-house software
factories, this subsidiary ranked low on the factory scale for both the
technology and policy criteria, reflecting the diverse nature of the company:
Some sections worked as part of the permament workforce in Hitachi's in-
house software factories, while other groups did customized systems
development for a wide variety of Japanese customers. In a sense, Hitachi
Software Engineering served primarily as a manpower facility for Hitachi
Software Works and Omori Software Works, following the factory practices
at these facilities, or applying them to projects it did independently.
Overall, however, it incorporated Hitachi technology such as CASD, CAPS,
and HIPACE, as well as developed modified in-house systems. Hitachi
Software Engineering was also remarkably efficient in project control. The
company reported in 1981 that it was able to complete 98% of projects on
time and 99% at an actual cost between 90% and 110% of the original
estimates. This compared to 300%-overruns during the early 1970s. The
average project size was 50,000 lines of code; the largest were about 500,000
lines. 107
As did the Hitachi factories, Hitachi Software Engineering emphasized
extensive programmer training (1-year training periods, including 2 months of
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off-the-job training when they entered the company), as well as strict
implementation of top-down, structured design and careful controls on
budgets and project management, including standard times for programmers
(design and coding). Historically, managers at the subsidiary focused first on
setting up a project and production auditing system (1969-1975); applying
structured programming techniques and software tools (1976-1978);
productivity improvement and quality assurance through the standardization
of methodologies and tools (1979-1981); and productivity and quality
improvement through the generation of reusable modules ("standard
patterns"), their cataloging in program libraries, and utilization in the
writing of new programs. Reusable modules included patterns for mainframe
operating systems and related programs, as well as for functions such as
message reception, message format and contents checking, data-base
management system processing, message editing and switching, screen
mapping, ine-overflow, error displays, program-function key code analysis,
screen editing, and table lookup. Managers also assigned programmers
exercises on a monthly basis to make them familiar with subroutines stored
in the program library. 108
Despite the lack of centralization and standardization for the subsidiary
as a whole, an integral and clearly stated component of management strategy
at Hitachi Software Engineering was rigid discipline. In fact, the two
managers who spearheaded the development of production technology at this
subsidiary, after moving over from Hitachi Software Works, openly admitted
to the use cf extensive training techniques to make programmers comply
with company standards for program design: "To meet our production
66
_I _________ _I_ 
_
criteria, project procedures have been standardized and imposed on
employees. If any modules deviate from the coding standard, they are
returned to the production line." 10 9
CONCLUSION
The survey revealed that Hitachi management was not as rigorous in
promoting certain factory-type concepts or even technologies as several
other firms, notably the NEC group, TRW, and Toshiba. In any case, Hitachi
is significant as an historical leader in introducing a strategic approach
toward the management of what is largely an engineering activity; and the
history of this firm's efforts in large-scale software reveals how a major
process innovation -- the software factory -- was conceived and
implemented.
Interviews with managers and a study of technical and historical
documentation indicate that Hitachi's movement toward the factory model
resulted from three interrelated strategies or decisions:
1) A company policy of establishing independent factories (which included
both product engineering and mass-production functions) for each major
product area.
2) Belief on the part of managers responsible for corporate- and division-
level strategy, as well as for software development, that a centralized
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and disciplined factory environment, integrating product engineering and
mass-production activities, offered for any product the potential of
improving worker productivity and quality, as well as project and cost
control.
3) Top management decision and commitment (including divisional
executives and, especially, the company president) to treat software as
a product whose development could and should be controlled in a
factory, as any other product the company manufactured -- making it
necessary to apply company-wide, standardized accounting and
management controls to all software engineering activities.
The history of Hitachi Software Works also indicates that the
foundations of the factory were primarily policy-oriented. Somewhere in
between technology and policy was the introduction of a structured
programming technique during the mid-1970s. Structured programming is
really a methodological tool; since it was necessary to train and require
programmers to use this as standard procedure, the use of this new
technology or tool involved critical policy decisions and implementation. This
was especially important because structured programming as defined by
Hitachi became the foundation of the factory's standard-times, cost-
accounting, and general production-control systems, as well as specific
support tools. The rather sophisticated (computer-aided) technological
infrastructure evolved after the basic policy infrastructure, but rapidly, from
a few tools at first to an extensive set of interrelated systems that are
increasingly being further integrated.
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A contrast between implementation of the factory model at Hitachi and
the experiment at System Development Corporation in the mid-1970s also
offers some suggestions regarding why one company might succeed better
than another at this approach. SDC attempted to introduce simultaneously a
factory system containing both a technological infrastructure and a policy
infrastructure (set of standard procedures covering system-analysis, design,
implementation, testing, and project-management). While the technology
(central production database, program library, automated documentation and
testing tools, etc.) was there, programmers seemed to dislike the
standardized environment and reusing other programmers' code. Perhaps
more important was that project managers disliked giving up control to the
factory and work for the facility dwindled; this led eventually to the
dismantling of the factory infrastructure through the dispersal of systems
engineers to different sites to develop programs, with little capability to
divide labor or reuse modules as once envisioned in the factory concept. 110
Hitachi, on the other hand, incrementally developed and imposed a
policy infrastructure over a period of several years, thereby training
programmers and managers to operate within a highly standardized, factory-
like environment. Hitachi modified these procedures gradually and then from
the mi-1970s began investing heavily in tools and large-scale computer-aided
systems -- the factory-type technological infrastructure. This shift in focus
to technology-based tools and automation thus came after successfully
innovating in process management by applying a standardized approach to
both system and applications software development.
69
_1_1_
One might also identify a parallel here with Toyota, a company often
cited for its excellence in production management. The largest Japanese
automaker has consistently demonstrated the world's highest levels of
physical productivity in automobile manufacturing by deemphasizing the use
of sophisticated automation or computer-based systems, preferring instead to
focus on process control and innovation, as well as flexible tools, to extend
the performance of human workers. Only after these policy innovations have
Toyota managers agreed to introduce more automation, but only if the
technology is sufficiently flexible (such as programmable robots) to fit into
its manufacturing system and supplement the efforts of human workers. 111
The comparison with Toyota, as well as the SDC case, reinforces the
notion that technological advances alone do not necessarily bring as many
benefits in productivity as simply better process management. The Hitachi
case in software suggests that, with the proper mixture of policy and
technology, including a strategy to assure the compliance of managers and
engineers or other programmers, the factory approach should offer several
advantages in efficiency. As suggested in the first paper from this research
project, these might include the following:
Institutionalization or dissemination of "good" technologies and
programming or management practices.
The production engineering departments in Hitachi's software factories,
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as well as the factory training programs, were responsible for introducing
techniques and tools that, in textbooks on software programming and
engineering management, are widely considered to be fundamentally good
practices. These include structured design methods; bug-forecasting data
collection and models; documentation standardization and control systems;
formal project-management and design-review systems; program libraries;
wide use of computer-aided design, coding, and testing tools; and promotion
of standardization of practices and reusability of code where possible.
Providing a sufficient scale of people and operations to ustify research
and development for improving process technology and techniques.
In addition to engineering departments in the software factories,
Hitachi also used the System Development Laboratory to perform R%D
activities related to programming support tools and methods. The
centralization of software production at the Software Works and Omori
provided an in-house core of 3000 programmers and supporting staff; Hitachi
Software Engineering and Nippon Business Consultant added another 5000.
Improving process efficiency through teamwork and better inter-group
communication.
This can be seen in two examples. One, is that the percentage of late
projects in the Software Works. dropped dramatically within a few years of
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the founding of -the factory, from over 72% in 1970 to 13% in 1973 and to a
remarkably low 7% in 1974 and 1979, with an average of 12% during 1974-
1985. The figure for 1986 was about 5%. These numbers placed Hitachi
Software Works along with other firms leading in this category. Variations
in these figures reflect the level of activity within the factory, with more
late projects when Hitachi was completing new large new projects -- for
example, a new mainframe operating system. But, in general, reporting
procedures, as well as CAPS (Computer-Aided Production Control System for
Software), made it possible to integrate manpower-control, process-control,
and quality-control functions and support tools. Another example of the
factory benefits is Hitachi's overturning of Brook's law about more
programmers added to a late project causing projects to be later. The
factory environment allowed Hitachi managers to add people (albeit the best
people available and not just anyone) to help finish projects on time.
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HITACHI SOFTWARE WORKS: PERFORMANCE DATA
Sales/Worker
100( ndex)
202
178
190
204
Projects Late
72.4
56.6
36.3
13.0
Reported Bugs
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1079
1093
1141
1288
1395
1398
1398
1419
1437
1666
1984 1833
1985 2018
331
313
360
386
468
6.9
9.8
16.8
16.1
9.8
505
594
678
792
943
1257
N.A.
7.4
10.7
14.0
12.9
18.8
16.3
18.0
N.A.
N.A.
N. A.
N.A.
100(I ndex)
79
48
30
19
13
13
14
Source: Based on data provided by Shibata Kanji, Manager, Engineering'
Dept., Hitachi Software Works, 23 July 1986.
Notes: Sales per worker reflects the value of software products sold by
Hitachi Software Works to other Hitachi profit centers as well as to outside
customers. Outside sales represented approximately 90% of revenues; in-
house customers were charged prices below market rates. Reported Bugs
refers to major bugs reported by outside customers per machine per month.
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Year
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
Workers
348
675
926
1107
1169
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Organizational focus on raising engineering productivity and product
quality (defect control).
As indicated in the table, sales productivity of Hitachi employees in the
Software Works doubled within one year of the factory's opening and has
increased significantly overtime, although direct productivity figures for the
facility are proprietary. Company-wide and factory programs, such as the
Management Improvement movement and system gleaning practice, formally
promoted the analysis and implementation of measures to improve labor
performance and product quality. The central production data base for the
factory started in the mid-1960s also made it possible to track programmer
productivity as well as defect measures, and thereby have precise data to use
in determining specific methods or in developing new tools to be used
throughout the factory. Perhaps most important, the administrative and
technological infrastructures of the factory -- manpower, process, quality,
and product control in the area of production management; standardization,
design, and inspection in the area of product engineering -- facilitate
performance analysis and improvement. Individuals do not have to expend
time and energy, for example, in deciding which languages or methods to
use, or whether to develop a particular support tool. Systems such as EAGLE
also save extensive manpower by automating much of testing and by
recycling program components.
In quality, Hitachi employs a measure of user-reported major bugs and
has reduced bugs from an index of 100 in 1978 to 14 in 1985. One unofficial
estimate is that this figure represented approximately 0.01 defects per
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program package per machine installation per year, and placed Hitachi in the
low category, along with other leaders in this measure that particpated in
the survey. 1 12 According to Shibata, the decrease in bugs reflected several
factors: a new System Simulation Tester (SST) completed in 1977-1979; CASD
(Computer-Aided Software Development System), another group-programming
tool to facilitate product standardization, design support, and inspection
functions; reused code, reaching approximately 90% in new releases of
products such as operating systems; and increasing sales of essentially bug-
free programs. 1 13
In addition, in terms of price/performance measurements and user
satisfaction, Hitachi-manufactured mainframes and accompanying software
sold through National Semiconductor (NAS) in the U.S. have been rated
consistently higher than IBM machines and software. For example, the
Hitachi/NAS AS/5000 and AS/7000, which competed with the IBM 3033 and
4341 mainframes, in a DATAPRO survey achieved overall satisfaction ratings
of 3.55. compared to 3.19 for the IBM machines. In terms of software in
particular, the Hitachi/NAS products rated 3.15, compared to approximately
3.03 for IBM (see table).
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COMPARISON OF IBM AND HITACHI MAINFRAMES AND SOFTWARE 114
HITACHI IBM
System Ratings AS/5000 3033
AS/7000 4341
Ease of Operation 3.78 3.32
Reliability of Mainframe 3.63 3.61
Manufacturer's Software
Operating System 3.17 3.10
Compilers/Assemblers 3.17 3.19
Application Programs 3.00 2.85
Ease of Programming 3.38 3.01
Ease of Conversion 3.38 3.01
OVERALL SATISFACTION 3.55 3.19
(includes maintenace
& technical support)
Number of Systems 10 318
Source: DATAPRO RESEARCH CORP.
Reducing waste and redundancies due to dysfunctional behavior of
individuals and the lack of an organizational strategy
High-level factory managers such as Sakata, as well as middle managers
from the engineering department such as Shibata, have set a clear direction
for personnel and technological development in the Software Works. Their
initial focus has been on gathering information on software technology and
then standardizing methods and tools, and setting factory-level performance
goals. Later efforts have foused on automation and reusability. The factory
infrastructure and strategy they have created has reduced the possibility of
individuals duplicating the efforts of others in tool or method development,
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as well as writing code, and lessened the likelihood of workers engaging in
practices that are contrary to the organizational goals such as to develop
reusable modules, or use factory-wide tools and standardized methods that
facilitate reusability, maintenance, testability, and the like.
Maintenance of organizational and technical "flexibility."
Both the technological and policy infrastructures of the Hitachi
software factories have been evolving since 1969. Most of the tools
developed for Hitachi Software Works (and then introduced in other Hitachi
facilities or subsidiaries), such as CAPS, CASD, HIPACE, and EAGLE, have
been adaptable enough to incorporate important technical advances, such as
additional linkages between systems, the addition of other support tools for
documentation, testing, and the like, or increased capabilities of adapting to
non-standardized customer needs. Structured design has also endured for
well over a decade. High levels of reusability indicate as well that Hitachi
programmers find modules in the program library are not obsolete. While
the factory approach might seem to make it difficult for a particular facility
to respond to a unique customer need or a specific type of technology,
Hitachi has been addressing these concerns through continued development of
customer-oriented design systems such as EAGLE, as well as the
establishment of numerous subsidiaries and new factory departments such as
for artificial intelligence.
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SURVEY RESULTS: DATA SUMMARY TABLE
I= Technological Infrastructure
II = Policy/Methodology Infrastructure
III = Total Factory Model
@ indicates two responses and averaged
COMPANY/FACI LITY
*NEC@
*Toshiba Software Factory
*NEC Information Service
*NT&T Comm. & Info. Proc. Lab.@
*Hitachi Omori Works
*Fujitsu Info. Proc. Sys. Lab.@
*Nippon Systemware
*Nippon Business Consultant
*Hitachi Software Engineering@
*Nippon Electronics Development
TRW
Unisys/Sperry@
Unisys/SDC
Control Data@
Martin Marietta/Maryland
Hughes Aircraft
Boeing Aerospace@
AT&T Bell Labs
Cullinet
Martin Marietta/Denver
Electronic Data Systems@
Honeywell/Defense Systems@
Draper Laboratories@
Computervision@
(32=100%)
(60=100%)
(92=100%)
or joint responses.
i
89%
84
81
81
78
77
72
56
53
41
II
89%
87
88
77
73
73
70
67
50
48
iii
89%
86
86
78
75
75
71
63
51
46
97 83 88
91 72 78
72 77 75
84 67 73
59 76 70
83 63 70
84 53 64
72 58 63
64 59 61
69 43 52
61 43 49
44 42 42
34 17 23
28 25 26
Applications Means
Japanese (*)
U.S.
69 62 65
71 72 72
67 55 60
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*NEC/Switching Systems
*NEC/Operating Systems
*Toshiba Software Factory
*NEC Software
*Hitachi Software Works@
*Fujitsu Numazu Factory@
*NT&T Comm. & Info. Proc. Lab.@
Control Data@
IBM Endicott
Data General Westboro & N.C.
Boeing Aerospace@
Unisys/Sperry@
IBM Raleigh
DEC (VMS)
Systems Means
Japanese (*)
U.S.
78 67 71
78 62 67
61 63 62
77 53 61
61 62 61
84 43 58
41 48 46
75 68 70
82 78 80
69 57 61
OVERALL MEANS
JAPANESE (*)
U.S.
71 64 67
76 75 75
68 56 60
Statistical Analysis of Sample:
Variable:
Sample Size:
Average:
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation:
Range
Kurtosis:
Standardized Kurtosis:
Totals
38
66.89
70
86
17.26
76
0.31
0.40
Technology
38
71.18
77
84
17.40
70
0.03
0.03
79
98%
92
84
84
78
77
58
99%
92
87
87
70
68
48
99%
92
86
86
73
71
51
Policy
38
64.45
67
43
18.59
82
0.02
0.03
_ __
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RANKINGS: TECHNOLOGY/FACILITY INFRASTRUCTURE
8 Questions; 32=100%
Key:
A.J. = Applications Japan
A.U. = Applications U.S.
S.J. = Systems Japan
S.U. = Systems U.S.
* = Japanese firms
COMPANY/FACI LITY
S.J *NEC/Switching Systems
A.U. TRW
S.J. *NEC/Operating Systems
A. U. Unisys/Sperry
A.J. *NEC
A.J. *Toshiba Software Factory
S.J. *Toshiba Software Factory
A.U. Boeing Aerospace
S.U. IBM Raleigh
S.J. *NEC Software
A.U. Hughes Aircraft
A.J. *NEC Information Service
A.J. *NT&T Comm. & Info. Proc. Lab.
A.J. *Hitachi Omori Works
S.U. IBM Endicott
A.U. Control Data
A.J. *Fujitsu Info. Proc. Sys. Lab
S.U. Control Data
S.J. *Hitachi Software Works
S.J. *Fujitsu Numazu Factory
S.U. Boeing Aerospace
A.J. *Nippcn Systemware
A.U. AT&T Bell Labs
A.U. Unisys/SDC
A.U. Martin Marietta/Denver
A.U. Cullinet
S.U. Data General Westboro N.C.
A.U. Electronic Data Systems
S.U. Unisys/Sperry
A.U. Martin Marietta/Maryland
S.J. *NT&T Comm. Info. Proc. Lab.
A.J. *Nippon Business Consultant
A.J. *Hitachi Software Engineering
A.U. Honeywell/Defense Systems
S.U. DEC (VMS)
A.J *Nippon Electronics Development
A.U. Draper Laboratories
A.U. Computervision
98
97
92
91
89
84
84
84
84
84
83
81
81
78
78
78
77
77
78
77
77
72
72
72
69
64
61
61
61
59
58
56
53
44
41
41
34
28
Flexible
Factory
Approach
Job Shop
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RANKINGS: POLICY/METHODOLOGY I NFRASTRUCTURE
15 Questions, 60=100%
COMPANY/FACILITY
S.J. *NEC/Switching Systems
S.J. *NEC/Operating Systems
A.J. *NEC
A.J. *NEC Information Service
A.J. *Toshiba Software Factory
S.J. *Toshiba Software Factory
S. J. *NEC Softwa re
A.U. TRW
A.Ut. Unisys/SDC
A.J. *NT&T Comm. & Info. Proc. Lab.
A.U. Martin Marietta/Maryland
A.J. *Fujitsu Info. Proc. Sys. Lab.
A.J. *Hitachi Omori Works
A. U. Unisys/Sperry
S. J. *Hitachi Software Works
A.J. *Nippon Systemware
S.J. *Fujitsu Numazu Factory
A.J. *Nippon Business Consultant
A. U.. Control Data
S.U. Control Data
S.U. Data General Westboro & N.C.
A.U. Hughes Aircraft
S.U. IBM Endicott
S.U. Unisys/Sperry
A. U. Cullinet
A.U. AT&T Bell Labs
S.U. Boeing Aerospace
A.U. Boeing Aerospace
A.J. *Hitachi Software Engineering
S.J. *NT&T Comm. & Info. Proc. Lab.
S.U. DEC (VMS)
A.J *Nippon Electronics Development
S. U. IBM Raleigh
A. U. Martin Marietta/Denver
A.U. Electronic Data Systems
A.U. Honeywell/Defense Systems
A. U. Computervision
A.U. Draper Laboratories
99
90
89
88
87
87
87
83
77
77
76
73
73
72
70
70
68
67
67
67
63
63
62
62
59
58
53
53
50
48
48
48
43
43
43
42
25
17
Flexible
Factory
Approach
Job Shop
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RANKINGS: TOTAL FACTORY MODEL
23 Questions, 92=100%
COMPANY/FACI LITY
S.J. *NEC/Switching Systems
S.J. *NEC/Operating Systems
A.J. *NEC
A.U. TRW
A.J. *NEC Information Service
A.J. *Toshiba Software Factory
S.J. *Toshiba Software Factory
S. J. *NEC Software
A. J. *NT&T Comm. Info. Proc. Lab.
A. U. Unisys/Sperry
A.U. Unisys/SDC
A. J. *Hitachi Omori Works
A.J. *Fujitsu Info. Proc. Sys. Lab.
S.J. *Hitachi Software Works
A. U. Control Data
S.J. *Fujitsu Numazu Factory
A.J. *Nippon Systemware
A.U. Martin Marietta/Maryland
S.U. Control Data
A.U. Hughes Aircraft
S.U. IBM Endicott
A.U. Boeing Aerospace
A.J. *Nippon Business Consultant
A.U. AT&T Bell Labs
S.U. Data General Westboro N.C.
S.U. Boeing Aerospace
A.U. Cullinet
S. U. Unisys/Sperry
S.U. IBM Raleigh
A. U. Martin Marietta/Denver
S.J. *N.,TT Comm. & Info. Proc. Lab.
A.J. *Hitachi Software Engineering
A.U. Electronic Data Systems
S.U. DEC (VMS)
A.J *Nippon Electronics Development
A. U. Honeywell/Defense Systems
A. U. Computervision
A.U. Draper Laboratories
99
91
89
88
86
86
86
86
78
78
75
75
75
73
71
71
71
70
70
70
67
64
63
63
62
61
61
61
58
52
51
51
49
46
46
42
26
23
Flexible
Factory
Approach
Job Shop
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APPENDIX II: TOSHIBA AND NEC
Toshiba
Toshiba, since the mid-1970s, has been the other Japanese leader in
pursuing factory practices, focusing on large, real-time control programs and
related systems software for industrial applications. The Fuchu Software
Factory in Tokyo had about 2300 software personnel in 1985.115 A major
article written in 1981 by the manager primarily responsible for developing
the Toshiba facility also cited the SDC factory experiment as a precedent.116
Toshiba's Software Factory contained about 200 terminals in three
buildings connected by high-speed data buses. One building focused on
software design, another on software and hardware design, and the third on
systems testing. The factory infrastructure itself revolved around "SWB," a
software workbench system first developed in 1977, comprising five main
tools: SADT (structured analysis for requirements definition); CASD
(computer-aided specification analysis and documentation); HIPO (hierarchy
plus input-process-output); PROMISS (program information management
system, to facilitate reuse of proven programs); and SYSGEN (system
generator, to generate software combining newly written modules and
standard modules). 1 1 7
The reuse of software modules was central to Toshiba's factory
strategy. To create an environment fostering reusability, Toshiba relied
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mainly on management, with a supporting factory infrastructure. For
example, it was an official policy to "promote registration of proven
programs and reuse." As an incentive to programmers and managers, reused
code counted the same as newly written code in productivity
measurements. 118 In terms of design technology, Toshiba stressed data
abstraction, clearly defined interfaces and parameters, as well as careful
cataloging of modules for the program library. 119 The languages used at
Toshiba did not in themselves facilitate reusabiity, however. In 1981, about
83% of the code was written in real-time FORTRAN and PL/I, 6% in
assembler, and 11% in a machine-oriented system description language. 120
None of these languages were specifically designed for data or procedural
abstraction (which is useful for reusability), although, in 1984, Toshiba was
using Ada to describe program structures, before building prototypes using
languages such as Prolog, APL, and Basic. 1 2 1
Based on the extensive reuse of code, Toshiba doubled productivity at
the Fuchu Software Factory after 1976, with programmers producing 3100
assembly-language equivalent instructions per month by 1985.122 In contrast,
U.S. programmers, according to a U.S. Deptartment of Commerce study,
typically produced about 300 lines of code per month. 12 3 At Toshiba, over
50% of the 3100 lines of code produced per programmer month in 1985, and
as much as 70 to 80% in some years (such as 1981), was reused from other
programs. 124 Along with the high rates of nominal productivity, moreover,
this extensive recirculation of debugged modules allowed Toshiba to report
merely 0.3 bugs per 1000 lines of code. 12 5 By comparison, a study of 60
large IBM projects showed an average of 3 errors per line of code -- 10
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times greater than Toshiba. 126
PRODUCTIVITY AT TOSHIBA'S FUCHU SOFTWARE FACTORY 127
Year 1000 Instructions/Programmer/Month
1972 1.23
1973 1.39
1974 1.37
1975 1.21
1976 1.39 New Code
1977 1.69 1.00
1978 1.94
1979 2.30
1980 2.60
1981 2.87
1985 3.10 1.60
NEC Corporation
NEC launched a "software strategy project" in 1976, focusing on
standardization, automation, elimination of waste, and quality control, in
addition to promotion of reusability. NEC also established a Software
Product Engineering Laboratory in 1980 to experiment with software-
development and management technologies, and to oversee their application
in company facilities and subsidiaries.128
THE NEC APPROACH TO SOFTWARE PRODUCTIVITY AND QUALITY
GOAL METHOD
Improvement in development CAD/CAM, Standardization
Reuse of existing software Reuse technology
Waste prevention Cross-product planning
Elimination of excess Methodology and tools for
functions requirement definition
Product quality improvement Software quality metrics, tools for
quality assurance
Personnel quality improvement Education programs for new and old
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employees and managers
Source: Fujino, p. 58.
For systems software and complex on-line programs, NEC developed a
factory-type system called SDMS (Software Production and Maintenance
System). NEC formulated the basic plan for SDMS in 1975, intending to
design a total support system for the development and maintenance of
modularized systems software. The first practical version was released for
in-house use in 1980, consisting of a software development data base and
three subsystems: for design, including a standardized design language and
programming methodology; for product management (configuration, updating,
retrieval); and for project management, including progress control and
productivity data. 129
NEC reported some resistance to adopting the standardization required
by SDMS, but by 1984 it was installed in all NEC computer centers. Several
experimental projects have also demonstrated significant improvements. For
example, in the design of a comptroller system with a data base, engineers
using SDMS showed twice the productivity rates compared to comparable
projects, including the discovery of 90% of the design errors before the
programming phase, and automatic generation of more than 90% of the design
documents, which previously were written by hand. In maintenance of an
overseas switching system, SDMS helped reduce man-hours in producing
upgrades and revisions by 90%.130
For applications software, NEC began developing what it calls STEPS
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(Standardized Technology and Engineering for Programming Support) in 1971,
completing a version for in-house use in 1972 and revising the system each
year thereafter, with considerable input as well from outside users. The
basic concepts of STEPS are (1) to promote integrated standards covering
the entire software development life cycle, with standards for methodology,
documentation, etc., and then (2) the use of a "prefabricated standard
program library" to facilitate the writing of new programs. 131 At 800 sites
within, and outside NEC through 1980, an NEC survey reported productivity
improvements in specification, coding, and debugging of between 26 and 91%
(Table). At 1200 sites by 1984, NEC reported 20% to 50% cost reductions in
analysis-design phases and 50% to 80% in program manufacturing phases. 13 2
NEC: STEPS PRODUCTIVITY SURVEY 1981
Key: S = Source Code Number
MD = Man-Days
T = Compile Time for Debug
STEPS NON-STEPS PRODUCTIVITY
IMPROVEMENT
Average Program Size 458 S 431 S
Specification 286 S/MD 361 S/MD 1.26
Coding 218 S/MD 416 S/MD 1.91
Debugging 68 S/T 92 S/T 1.35
TOTAL 64 S/MD 101 S/MD 1.53
Source: Azuma and Mizuno (1981), p. 95.
NEC's application of its "traditional" manufacturing techniques to
software can be seen most clearly in quality control. Administration of this
function is linked directly to computer hardware "zero defect" activities and
extends down to programmers organized, as in hardware production facilities,
into quality circles. Since around 1981, these have been meeting 2 hours per
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week, and applying tools such as data sorting, control charts, pareto charts,
and cause-effect diagrams to software projects.133 Some results are as
follows:
NEC SOFTWARE
GROUP DIVISION
1 Switching
2 Transmission
control
3 Minicomputers
4 Large OS
QUALITY CONTROL RESULTS
TARGET RESULTS
Machine time Down 1/3
for debug
Bug ratio 1.37/KS to 0.
Bug Ratio
Bug ratio
Source Size
Object Size
5 Large Appli- Spec ch.
cations
Source: Mizuno (1983), p. 71.
anges
41/KS
0.35/KS to 0.20/KS
6/Month to 0.9/Month
20KS to 8KS
72KB to 26KB
Down 40%
Along with developing their own technology, NEC engineers extensively
studied American software techniques, including SDC's estimating model and
then the Software Factory during the 1970s as approaches to cost-estimation
and project control. 13 4 During the mid-1980s, NEC also launched a study of
factory-type layout environments for software engineers to improve
productivity. 13 5 In addition, the manager of NEC's Software Product
Engineering Laboratory publicly stated in a 1984 article that "software
factory realization" was one of the most important areas "[c]ompanies that
expect to meet future demands must direct their efforts to."136
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